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‘Changing Turkey in a Changing World’ reveals various British archives on the Turkey’s Independence War in order to assist the historians working on the field. The documents below are mostly the diplomatic correspondence between the British Ministry of War and the British Embassy in Istanbul during 1920 and 1921. The documents assess the political composition of the newly founded Turkish Grand National Assembly; the bilateral relations between the Nationalists led by Ataturk and Germany and Italy; and offers a correspondence letter informing about the activities of Enver Pasha during the war. Finally, the archive includes the translated version of the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) adopted in January 1920.

Reference: FO 371/6531

For more archival information, contact: changingturkey@gmail.com

The Political Composition of the Turkish Grand National Assembly according to Britain (1921)

According to the document, the majority of the parliament is populated by the ‘moderates’ led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) who wish to establish peace under the basis of ‘national pact’, while two minority groups are perceived as openly hostile against Britain seeking the backing of Russia.

The activities of Enver Pasha in Rome during the War of Independence

According to the report, Enver Pasha visited Rome and Berlin seeking future collaboration with the Islamic Societies in Europe.

The British Assessment of the bilateral relations between the Ankara Government and Germany

The British Assessment of the bilateral relations between the Ankara Government and Italy

The English Translation of Misak-i Milli [National Pact]

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Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan

International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 1, 3-23 (2010)

by Ayse Zarakol

This article joins the growing scholarship on the ontological security needs of states. By focusing on state denial of historical crimes, the article will address the main point of contention among scholars who study ontological security, i.e. the question of whether identity pressures on states are mostly endogenously or exogenously generated. Through a study of the Turkish state’s reluctance to apologize for the Armenian genocide, and the Japanese discomfort over the WWII atrocities, I argue that we can avoid tautology in our generalizations by introducing temporal and spatial dimensions to the argument. Inter-subjective pressures matter more at times when traditional routines defining the self are broken and are more likely to create ontological insecurity outside the West. The review of the Turkish and Japanese cases demonstrate that both social and individualistic approaches to ontological security are partly right, but also incomplete because neither takes into account the uneven expansion of international society or the effect this expansion has had on the identity of outsider states who were incorporated into the system at a later date.

Key Words: apology • identity • international society • Japan • ontological security • shame • Turkey

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Dr. Maria Ruxandra Stoicescu – independent consultant and researcher based in Geneva, Switzerland. Graduated from the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development. PhD thesis: “Liminality in International Relations. A discursive analysis of three cases: Romania,Turkey, Ukraine”. Radio Segment on World Radio Switzerland, International Relations Uncovered.

CHANGINGTURKEY: Could you tell us a bit about your recent/forthcoming publications dealing with Turkey? We would be particularly happy to hear about your new article ‘Representing Liminality: Images, Metaphors and Subject Positions’.

DR. STOICESCU: One forthcoming publication is based on my PhD thesis, which was a comparative three case studies approach to the question of liminality in international relations. One of the cases examined was Turkey, for which I analysed political elite discourse and its illustration of Turkey’s liminal position with respect to Europe and the EU. I looked at what images, metaphors and subject positions developed according to the different stages of negotiations with the EU from 1989 to 2006. I concluded that until 2006 there was a predominance of the metaphor and image of the “bridge” of civilisations; perhaps more interestingly, I identified the different discursive strategies that were used to weave together identity issues, geopolitical questions and security policies with respect to the liminal position. Turkey operated mainly by reacting negatively or rejecting identity cues coming from its European partners, attitude which informed the construction of its discourse on the liminal. Another interesting feature of this case was the play of subject positions, of the “us/them” “we/they” dichotomies that changed quite dramatically over 16 years. After 2006 Turkey has developed a different position, which emphasises more its centrality to a number of issues, rather than its liminal quality. The article mentioned deals with the elements outlined above.

CHANGINGTURKEY: What are the potential limitations of the existing analyses on Turkish politics and society, in your opinion? Could you suggest any gaps in the literature or any potential pitfalls?

DR. STOICESCU: Perhaps the biggest limitation is the adoption of a European or Western perspective – even by Turkish scholars – on analyses of Turkey. The scientific criteria elaborated in the West are extremely useful for producing reliable research, but Turkish “matter”, as in cultural and political elements, are needed so that researchers can come up with new categories of analysis, and possibly new ways of performing it. Many of the best Turkish scholars have been educated and trained in top Western universities, which helps inscribe Turkish research at the highest levels, but I think it would be a plus to bring a more anthropological view or approach of Turkey in IR studies of it.

CHANGINGTURKEY: What is the best manuscript you’ve read on Turkish politics and society so far? Could you suggest our readers any Turkey-focused research you’ve found valuable?

DR. STOICESCU: As far as I am concerned, the best manuscripts that I found were the writings of Elif Safak, which are literary productions, because they brought a different view of Turkey, away from standardised analyses. And for some valuable Turkey related research:

European Stability Initiative, 2005, ‘Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia’. Available at www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf. Accessed June 2008.

Rumelili, B. (2003), ‘Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the context of community building by the EU’, European Journal of International Relations, 9 (2)

Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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Excerpt from Ziya Onis (2009) “Contesting for the ‘Center’: Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and The Controversy over EU Membership in Turkey”, Bilgi University European Institute Working Paper No: 2 EU/2/2010, [online]: http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr/docs/working%20paper2_101209.pdf

The current constitutional crisis in the EU may ironically create an opportunity space for Turkey. Clearly what is at stake in the constitutional debate is the future direction of the European project. If the outcome of the constitutional crisis is the development of the EU more in the direction of what Jan Zielonka calls a loosely structured “medieval empire”, which is broadly consistent with the British vision rather than the kind of deep integration project favored by the French, this will naturally embody very significant implications for the future place of Turkey in the European context. If the future path of the EU involves a British style integration process of a relatively loose, intergovernmental Europe with relatively flexible boundaries which allows significant scope for national autonomy, the prospects for Turkish accession will be considerably improved. In contrast, if the dominant style of integration is based on the French project of deep integration- the idea of Europe as a “place” with fixed boundaries as opposed to a flexible “space”-the natural inclination will be to include Turkey as an “important outsider” rather than a “natural insider” in a special partnership style arrangement. Our interpretation of the current constitutional impasse in Europe having reached a peak with the negative vote in Irish referendum of June 2008 is that the dominant tendency in the foreseeable future is likely to be the first scenario of flexible integration which clearly constitutes a development in Turkey’s favor.

What we increasingly observe in the current era is the emergence of an implicit broad and mutually reinforcing coalition for “special partnership”, which seems to be deeply rooted, but for rather different reasons, both in the European and Turkish contexts. This constitutes a significant danger from the point of Turkey’s full-membership prospects. The proponents of Turkish membership both at home and abroad appear to be increasingly less vocal and enthusiastic compared to their Turko-skeptic and Euro-skeptic counterparts. The retreat to “loose Europeanization” certainly does not signify the abandonment of the Europeanization project altogether. What it means, however, is that the EU will no longer be at the center-stage of Turkey’s external relations or foreign policy efforts. This, in turn, is likely to have dramatic repercussions for the depth and intensity of the democratization process in Turkey especially in key areas such as a complete reordering of military-civilian relations, an extension of minority rights and a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, as well as counteracting the deeply embedded problem of gender inequality. There exist key elements within the Turkish state and Turkish society, which would be quite content with the loose Europeanization solution given the perceived threats posed by a combination of deep Europeanization and deep democratization for national sovereignty and political stability. The fears of deep Europeanization are not simply confined to the defensive nationalist camp. There also exists considerable conservatism even in the much more globally oriented AKP circles, when it comes to deep democratization agenda, as it is clearly evident from the resistance to the repealing of the article 301 of the penal code.

A final question to raise in this context is whether the drift towards loose Europeanization is likely to be reversed. The likelihood of a major reversal in the immediate term appears to be rather low. From a longer-term perspective, two possibly mutually reinforcing developments may facilitate a renewed impetus to the deep Europeanization agenda. The first element of such a scenario would involve a new enlargement wave in Europe, which would incorporate the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Turkey as a country, which has already reached the point of accession negotiations will not be immune to such a process. The second element of such a scenario would involve the emergence of a strong counter-movement from the more liberal and Western-oriented segments of the Turkish society, who will place Europeanization and reform firmly on its political agenda.

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Date: Friday 29 January, 13.30-14.30

Venue: Arundel House, 13–15 Arundel Street, Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX

Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey

on

“New World Geopolitics: How Turkey is Contributing to Global Peace and Security as a Member of the UN Security Council?”


Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu graduated from the Bosporus University in 1983 with a double major in Political Science and Economics at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. He completed his MA in the Department of Public Administration and received his PhD from the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bosporus University. He then worked at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Marmara University.

Following the November 2002 elections Professor Davutoğlu was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large by the 58th Government of the Republic of Turkey. He continued to serve in the 59th and 60th Governments. He worked at Beykent University in Istanbul as a professor from 1995 to 2004, serving as Head of the Department of International Relations, Member of University Senate and Member of Board of Management while teaching as a visiting scholar at the Marmara University. He has published several books and articles on foreign policy in Turkish and English. His books and articles have also been translated into several languages including Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Arabic, Persian and Albanian.

On May 1, 2009 he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60th Government of the Republic of Turkey.

Professor Davutoğlu is married with four children and speaks English, German and Arabic.

This event will be chaired by Adam Ward, Director of Studies, IISS, and will take place in the Lee Kuan Yew Conference Room at Arundel House

RSVP:

Eleanor Pitt

Email: pitt@iiss.org

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Excerpt from Yaman Akdeniz(2003), “Internet Governance, and Freedom in Turkey”, in Christiane Hardy and Christian Muller (eds), Spreading the Word on the Internet: 16 answers to 4 questions, Reflections on Freedom of the Media and the Internet, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (“OSCE”) Representative on Freedom of the Media, pp29-43, Vienna.

Because of cultural, historical and socio-political diversity, there will inevitably be divergent approaches to the growth and governance of the Internet in different European societies. For example, while the German and French governments have political fears and sensitivities about the use of the Internet by Neo-Nazis, the United Kingdom takes a more relaxed attitude to the dangers of racism but conversely has a long cultural tradition of repression towards the availability of sexually explicit material. On the other hand, the Turkish government, may be more concerned about defamatory statements made in relation to state officials and politicians, and the dissemination of racist and xenophobic propaganda.

The Turkish government adopted a hands-off approach to regulation of the Internet until 2001. However, during 2001, the Turkish government introduced a parliamentary bill with the intention of regulating internet publications according to the same rules that govern the mass media. This prompted strong protests and it was thought that “the bill was aimed at stifling the independence of a few aggressive Internet news portals, which have been publishing stories about corruption and politics that the mainstream media — firmly tied to the establishment — consider too hot to handle.”

The bill was vetoed by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President of Turkey in June 2001. Sezer at the time stated that:

“The most important aspect of Internet broadcasting, which is like a revolution in communication technology, is that it is the most effective area for freely expressing and spreading ideas and for forming original opinions….. Leaving the regulation of the Internet to public authorities completely and linking it to the Press Law does not fit with the characteristics of Internet broadcasting.”

This however proved a Pyrrhic victory for the opponents as the sponsors of the Bill were successful the following year. In May 2002, the Parliament approved the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) Bill (No 4676). The bill regulates the establishment and broadcasting principles of private radio and television stations and amends the current Turkish Press Code. It includes provisions that would subject the Internet to restrictive press legislation in Turkey. Although it attempts to apply only some aspects of the Press Code (such as to do with publishing “lies”), the vague provisions are open to various interpretations. Critics maintain that the rationale behind these provisions would appear to be the silencing of criticism of the Members of the Turkish Parliament and to silence political speech and dissent.

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Excerpt from Erhan Icener (2009) “Understanding Romania and Turkey’s Integration with the European Union: Conditionality, Security Considerations and Identity”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society,vol.10, no.2, pp.225-239.

Existing studies on enlargement suggest three key variables – conditionality, security considerations and identity – in explaining the decisions influencing the enlargement process. These variables inform and shape EU member states and institutions’ positions and decisions. In assessing the relative importance of these three key variables for explaining the key decisions influencing Romania’s and Turkey’s integration with the EU, this article argues that while none of these variables alone determines enlargement there is a reciprocal relationship between them and the actions of EU member states and institutions that does.

This article has challenged the validity of dominant assumptions stating that progress of an applicant towards EU membership depends primarily on conditionality. Analysis of Romania’s and Turkey’s experiences shows that the two countries have seen their relations upgraded and prospects improve at key points despite their lack of progress in meeting the required criteria. The article has shown that there is a direct link between key decisions in Romania’s and Turkey’s integration and various contextual shifts. Both the end of the Cold War and the Kosovo crisis had a significant influence on key enlargement decisions and on how conditionality has been applied. Contextual shifts can lead to changes in the role that conditionality plays and help alter the enlargement preferences of member states.

Underlining the contested nature of European identity, the article has highlighted that the two broad versions are at play at all times but with shifting formal and informal roles in influencing key decisions on when to enlarge and who to include. The article has challenged the dominant discourse based on a ‘Europe of norms and values’ and showed, via the Turkish case, that as fears about the future of European identity increase and ‘Europe’ moves closer to different cultures and its ‘natural’ borders, the role and influence of a ‘Europe of culture and geography’ increases too.

Enlargement is an ongoing and evolving policy of the EU. The dynamics of the process and the variables influencing decisions are evolving in a manner that responds, in part at least, to changes in European and global politics. Due to their core roles in European integration and enlargement, conditionality, security considerations and identity are expected to continue to influence enlargement in the future. With regard to conditionality, which can and often does play an important role, two developments should be noted. First, the criteria are getting tougher and the EU is more actively using conditions flexibly and as a tool to manage enlargement. Second, the tension between deepening and widening raises the importance of EU-focused conditionality – the EU’s absorption/integration capacity – for future enlargement. Discussions about the finality of European integration, the reform of the EU, the changing identity of the EU, and debates on the role it wants to play in world politics will all shape debates on enlargement. This indicates that enlargement-related debates will increasingly centre around EU-focused as much as applicant-focused conditionality. Therefore, the relationship between the past, present and future of European integration needs to be considered when projecting the future of enlargement.

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By Stacy Maruskin (International Strategic Research Organization [ISRO/USAK], Turkey)

Last week’s meeting on Dec. 7 between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Barack Obama seemed rather fleeting; it came and went without any exceptional developments or stern warnings. There were journalists in Turkey complaining that nothing eventful came to fruition; the scolding and caution they believed Erdoğan would receive for his behavior, and Turkey’s “pulling away” from the West, was instead replaced with praise and re-affirmation that America wants Turkey as a friend and ally in the region. In fact, the U.S. president extended his support for Turkey to continue its mediation role in Iran (if it can do so) and encouraged Ankara to facilitate Iranian compliance in curbing its nuclear ambitions; a demand the international community has pushed to no avail.

While the press in Turkey has been critical of the country’s role and outward friendship with Iran, a state that is blacklisted by the world, Obama’s invitation for Ankara to continue its efforts with Tehran left some critics puzzled. It was rather amusing to witness those who had harshly criticized Turkey over its endeavors now peddle backwards in their discourse and applaud Turkey’s efforts in dealing with Iran.

Yet, every great power needs a regional wing man, and Turkey seems to be the reliable partner the U.S. wants in this corner of the world. The relationship between the U.S. and Iran has been a cold one since the 1979 Islamic revolution; there has been no love lost. Any expectations that the U.S. could ever tame Iran by itself are fanciful at best. For Iran, the West has lost all credibility, and Iranian suspicions still exist as to what Turkey’s actual motive might be in meditating Iran’s fight against the world. After all, Turkey was once the superpower in the region during the Ottoman heyday, and for hundreds of years it was Persians vs. Ottomans over supremacy in the neighboring expanse. Turkish foreign policy aims to be a regional power once more; it continues to rise from the ashes of the Treaty of Sevres, a treaty that nearly led to the modern Republic of Turkey being swallowed up by other international actors. However, if Iran is worried about Turkey for those reasons, then they are sorely mistaken. The Turks are not trying to re-create the glory days of the Empire; they are trying to tame their neighbors.

Unfortunately, as of late, it seems Iran is rebuking Turkish advances and support. Ironically, soon after Obama gave his support to Turkey, Iran made an announcement that it did not need Turkish mediation in its struggles with the world community and that it would continue its uranium enrichment program as is. This declaration came only one day after Obama said he had told Erdoğan “how important it is to resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear capacity in a way that allows Iran to pursue peaceful nuclear energy but provides assurances that it will abide by international rules and norms,” adding, “I believe that Turkey can be an important player in trying to move Iran in that direction.”

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been adamant in her stance that sanctions will be imposed if Iran does not straighten up its act, often times using aggressive rhetoric. A few political pundits in the states have argued that the U.S. is just waiting for the right opportunity to strike Iran (with sanctions first of course). If Iran fails to comply with any of the demands made upon it, and becomes even more cagey and secretive, sanctions will be proposed and most likely enacted. It seems that if Turkey had made any headway at all in the past months with Iran, after Obama’s announcement voicing support for Turkish mediation, Iran has once again become skeptical of whom it keeps for company. Prior to Erdoğan meeting Obama, the White House had not said much on the issue, it was Europe and within Turkey itself that critics began lashing out at Turkey’s undertaking in Middle Eastern affairs, with specific reference to Iran during most of those censures. Turkish mediation would be Iran’s last chance if it continues to evade questions. If Iran proceeds to turn its back on Turkey, they will have no heavy hitters in their corner.

The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has repeatedly sounded off on the nuclear issue. At last week’s White House meeting he reiterated that Iran’s nuclear program should be dealt with diplomatically and criticized the rush to impose sanctions on Iran. Earlier this month, Turkey abstained from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s, or IAEA, vote to rebuke Iran’s secret building of a second nuclear plant, an abstention that caused much disparagement over its decision. Even China and Russia, who have major interests in Iran and have long maintained that sanctions are not necessary, partook in the 26-3 vote. After Turkey displayed its bid of solidarity with Iran, disappointment in Turkey’s decision became apparent. However, for all the criticism Turkey has received, as usual, it is important to remember its location and the new policy understanding it is trying to implement within the region. Although the latter does not excuse all behaviors, whether past, present or future, it can offer explanations as to why Ankara behaves the way it does sometimes. Turkey does not need another war in its region. If an aggression occurs against Iran, once more Turkey will find itself on the doorstep of conflict. Turkey wants dialogue and diplomatic solutions, it hopes to integrate the Middle East on the basis of economics and communication, and any collapse of these will harm those aspirations.

Washington gave its support for Turkey to further its efforts in trying to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue; however, it is uncertain whether Iran will allow Turkey to step into that role once more. Whatever place Turkey aims to take in Iranian affairs, it is safe to say that it should expect the unexpected with Iran. Erdoğan has defended Iran’s undertakings and called them a friend, but what has Iran done for Turkey? Perhaps Turkey has exhausted all its capabilities for this particular affair, perhaps it needs to step aside and let the international community deal the crippling economic blows to Iran that it has threatened to do for so long.

Originally published in Hurriyet Daily News.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.+

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George Christou is an Associate Lecturer in European Politics, Department of Politics and international Studies, University of Warwick, UK, and has previously held positions as: a Research Associate at the Centre for Public Policy, Northumbria University, UK (2004-5); a Research Associate at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK (2003-4); and as a Lecturer in European Politics at the Department of Government, University of Manchester (2001-3). His main research interests include: the EU’s role in conflict resolution/transformation, with specific interest in Cyprus and more recently, the frozen conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood ; the EU’s policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood (European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership etc); the EU as an actor in Internet Governance and the political economy of European and Global Internet Governance. His main research monographs (books) include: ’The New Electronic Market Place: European Governance Strategies in a Globalising Economy’ (Edward Elgar, 2007); ‘The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus’, (Basingstoke: MacMillan-Palgrave, 2004). He has also published in journals such as Governance, Journal of Public Policy, International Spectator and has articles forthcoming in Political Geography (2010), Geopolitics (2009) and Cooperation and Conflict (2010). He is currently working as part of a Warwick team (led by Prof. Stuart Croft) on a three year EU-funded FP7 project on the European Union as a Global-Regional Actor in Peace and Security (EU-GRASP).  He is also editing a Special Issue of the journal ‘European Security’ on EU Security Governance.

CT: Could you tell us a bit about your recent/forthcoming publications?

GC: My research interests have several dimensions, one of which is the EU’s impact on the Cyprus conflict. Most recent and forthcoming publications on this include:

Christou G (2004), ‘The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus’, Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan

Christou G (2006), The European Union: What Role in The Cyprus Conflict’, International Spectator, No.2, June 2006

Christou G, (2010, forthcoming), ‘The European Union, Borders and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Cyprus’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.45, No.1

Work in progress on the EU and Cyprus includes:

‘The European Commission as an Actor in the Cyprus Conflict’, Paper presented at the BISA Annual Conference, Leicester, 14-16 December 2009

CT: What are the potential limitations of the existing analyses on the EU’s role in Cyprus conflict, in your opinion? Could you suggest any gaps in the literature or any potential pitfalls?

GC: There has been a proliferation of work on the EU’s role in the Cyprus conflict in recent years.  A potential gap that exists in the current literature is the lack of attention in conceptualising or theorising the strategies employed by the local conflict actors in Cyprus and the impact this has on the ability of the EU to actually transform the conflict border. Although much of the literature has investigated conflict actor perceptions and the domestic politics of the Cyprus dispute as well as how Cypriots actors have interpreted and utilised EU norms, there is room for a more nuanced analysis of the co-constitution of conflict borders, the nature of these borders and the strategies employed by conflict actors.

CTCould you suggest any Turkey-focused research you’ve found valuable?

GC: Most recent Turkey-focused research that I have found useful and interesting from my own personal research perspective includes:

Articles:

Owen Parker, (2009) ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’ and the EU-Turkey question: the politics of a ‘common destiny’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (7), Oct 2009: 1085-1101

Baban, F and Keyman F, (2008) ‘Turkey and the Postnational Europe: challenges for the cosmopolitan political community’,  European Journal of Social Theory, 11 (1): 107-24

Diez, T. (2007), ‘Expanding Europe: The ethics of EU-Turkey relations’, Ethics and International Affairs, 21 (4): 415-22

Books:

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009

Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere (eds.), Religion, politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008

Natalie Tocci (ed.) ‘Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy’, (available on the Istituto Affari Internazionali website: http://www.iai.it/)

Joseph S. Joseph (ed.), Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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C. Akça ATAÇ received her PhD in History from Bilkent University. Among her research interests, there are the theories and rhetoric of empire, neo-Stoicism, historical cosmopolitanism and definitions of normativism. On topics of empire and normativism, she has published both in the referred international and national journals and the newspapers and popular magazines. She spent the summer term as a Visiting Scholar at the UCLA and currently teaches Diplomatic History at Çankaya University, Ankara.

NEO-OTTOMANISM:  UNIVERSALITY VS PARTIALITY

C. Akça ATAÇ

A student of theories and history of empire, though s/he contemplates mostly on the non-existent or the past, cannot remain indifferent to the contemporary manifestations of empire or resurface of imperial aspirations. The prominent professors of the Imperial Studies have been giving considerable thought to whether the US, EU, Russia and China are fit to be considered modern-time empires. It seems that for the Social Sciences, empire has become a topic as recurrent as it is in the Humanities. A brief Google search of the phrase “empire strikes back” would reveal hundreds of recent hits. Even though International Relations as discipline hurried to announce in the last century the irreversible extinction of empires from the international order, empire has been for sometime striving to restore its relevancy in understanding and explaining the current affairs.

Given the new tendencies in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has begun to be increasingly perceived as another contender for empire in the 21st century. Its historical character as the descendent of the Ottoman Empire, of course, encourages such perceptions. The AKP foreign policy, shaped in the hands of the long-time advisor to the Prime Minister and now the rather fresh Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, lays particular and forceful emphasis on the relations with Turkey’s immediate eastern neighbours and beyond. The moment that the AKP government has pointed the Middle East as its requisite geography of interest, co-operation, and action, the Turkish foreign policy has been inevitably connoted with an Ottomanist revival. Neo-Ottomanism, as this revival is popularly known, is not peculiar to the AKP government since the term was first deployed to assess the nature of the foreign missions of Turgut Özal era in the early 1990s. What did not gain currency back then, however, has stuck strong in 2009 and neo-Ottomanism has come to be understood by the scholars and journalists as the backbone of Turkey’s ambitious novel design for relaunching itself as a regional superpower.

Davutoğlu’s best-selling manifesto of foreign policy, “Strategic Depth,” prescribes that the Turkish republic’s persistent foreign-policy priority of allying with the US and Western Europe has rendered Turkey one-sided, under-capacity, and less exciting. A reconnection with the rest of the world, in particular with the Middle East, would overhaul Turkey’s capabilities as a regional and global actor. This strategy rises on the principles of aiming “zero-problem” with neighbours, providing them with both freedom and security, pursuing multi-dimensional policies of political and economic integration and conducting dynamic diplomacy. Once Turkey has thus embraced its greater neighbourhood, its ties with the US and EU would be automatically tightened further. Turkey’s just-rekindled relations with Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern countries, which were previously the dominions of the Ottoman Empire, seem to be in compliance with the vision of “Strategic Depth.”

The word neo-Ottomanism has never been used at the official level and, as it looks, will never be heard from a Turkish official, unless through a Freudian slip. Nevertheless, –similar to how the world has caught up on the term “American Empire”– it has acquired a widespread usage and acceptance worldwide, hence altered the basic tone of Turkish foreign policy. Although some rejoice in the overt enthusiasm in the face of Turkey’s reclaim of its Ottoman imperial legacy, the author of this opinion piece would like to join with those who contemplate rather on the unbalanced and immature side of this neo-Ottoman rhetoric and action-plan.

First of all, Ottomanism has a baggage burdened with post-colonial discourse, rarely evidence-based, mostly value-charged historical analyses, and political clichés. One recent book on world empires, Amy Chua’s Day of Empire, for instance excludes the Ottoman Empire from consideration under the unjust pretext of having been intolerant. If Turkey sets to launch a fully enhanced foreign-policy strategy that will undo its past faux-pas such as the negligence of the East and undermining of its global-actorness capacity, it should be able to construct a rhetoric brand new, more universal than ever and reminding of no past exemplar. Association with past creates reasonable doubt over the virtue of the message aimed to be conveyed. Second, neo-Ottomanism has a strong religious connotation giving the impression that it is partial to Islam. AKP’s Islamic emphasis on real politics and the Prime Minister’s unconditional support to the Muslim world leaders, including some very problematic names such as Iran’s Ahmedinejad and Sudan’s Al-Bashir, harm the universality and sincerity of the mission at hand and justify the reservations over the partiality of neo-Ottomanism. Furthermore, neo-Ottomanist diplomacy to the Middle East has not so far achieved a positive, tangible impact in Turkey’s EU bid. On the contrary, it may have underpinned the un-Europeaness of Turkey in the eyes of Europe’s Turco-sceptics.

Amin Maalouf’s recent book Le Dérèglement du Monde urges the leaders and peoples around the world, particularly of the Middle East, to avoid the past reflexes that had ended in certain catastrophes and to proceed towards an unprecedentedly new phase in human history. Only the opening of a phase in which the legitimacies, identities, values, and norms will be recreated from the beginning could, as Maalouf argues, save our civilisations lethally endangered by partiality. And it is my wish to see Turkey to partake in the recreation of universality rather than to create yet another partiality in the international community.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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