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Posts Tagged ‘binnaz toprak’

Ahmet Kuru’s review of the report (which, by the way, was published as a book by Metis in 2009 under the title Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler), is unfortunately typical of criticisms that appeared in the Turkish media immediately after the results of the research were made public. And like many such criticisms, it seems that Dr. Kuru has only cursorily read the report. Although I am weary of answering the same criticisms over and over again, I decided to do so briefly because this Blog apparently is read mostly by Turkish students studying in the US who may not be familiar with the debate that the report stirred here in Turkey.  For readers of the Blog who know Turkish and are interested in discussions about the report, I have included a piece that was originally published in Milliyet, and its longer version that was later added as a last chapter to the book. Together, they more thoroughly answers these and similar criticisms.

Dr. Kuru suggests that “conservative political and social actors should read the report carefully, if they seek to understand how Kemalists feel about the changing dynamics of Turkey.” As I will point out below, this research did not solely cover the Kemalists. Nor does it talk about feelings but rather reports concrete cases of discrimination, ostracism and even violence against people with different identitites. Hence, Dr. Kuru’s only positive comment about the research distorts both its aim and its content.

Dr. Kuru’s major criticism against the research is that it left out state and societal oppression that “conservative Sunni Muslims” face. This criticism comes as a surprise since the report itself points out that republican secularism has pushed these people to the margins of Turkish society by excluding them from centers of political power, social status, and intellectual prestige and that this group, too, has faced discrimination and represssion by both the secular state and secularist groups.  It also points out the reasons why this group was not included in the research. In other words, the report contains the answer to this criticism.

The answer to his next criticism is also in the report. Contrary to what Dr. Kuru claims, the interviews were not “largely conducted with members or sympathizers of Kemalist associations, such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri”. Yes, these people were included but by no means were the interviews “largely” conducted with them. The report has a page and a half of a list about the people interviewed. These included young men who had long hair or wore earrings, young women who wore short skirts and sleeves, people who did not fast during Ramadan or who did not go to Friday prayers, doctors, nurses, teachers, government employees, the esnaf, businessmen, professionals, uncovered women, Kurdish students, leftist students, the Alevi, the Roma, and the few Christians left in these towns. All of these people were insulted and/or subjected to violence in public simply because they were different from the majority in the towns in which they lived or faced discrimination by government authorities.

Third, Dr. Kuru claims that the report “portrays neighborhood pressure as a recent phenomenon and implicitly depicts AKP government as responsible for this new trend.”  This claim, is again, wrong. On the contrary, the report makes a clear distinction about what is new and what has come with a historical baggage.  For example, the social ostracism Alevis face has historical roots, but giving the official name of  Yavuz Sultan Selim Mahallesi to an Alevi neighborhood in Sultanbeyli — a sultan who almost wiped out the Alevi from Anatolia– has nothing to do with history but was a policy of the AKP mayor there, as was the case in several towns where AKP mayors refused to give permission for the building of cemevi or obstructed their construction. Nor is the “new” solely attributed to the AKP. The report has long sections in this regard about the Fethullah Gülen community as well as the ultra-nationalist youth groups.

Fourth, Dr. Kuru argues that the report “emphasizes consumption of alcohol as an important characteristic of a secular way of life.” It does nothing of the kind. In fact, it explicitly states that the authors give neither a positive nor a negative connotation to the drinking of alcohol. What it questions is the liquor ban in restaurants and bars by AKP mayors in most of the towns visited, the criminalizatioon of which the authors find to be unacceptable for any conception of a free and liberal society.

Finally, about Dr. Kuru’s comments on Foucault, power, and the headscarf:  I would be the last person to be accused of being insensitive to the plight of covered women. Over the years, I have repeatedly and publicly defended their right to education. However, I neither think that covered women are the only group who face discrimination nor do I think that the discourse of neighborhood pressure is employed as a display of power. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that the belittling of this discourse conceals the exercise of power by the majority against those who, either by birth or by choice, are different, and therefore, powerless. I have to yet hear “conservative Sunni Muslims”, as Dr. Kuru depicts them, to show sensitivity to the rights violations of other groups, as clearly shown in public opinion surveys. I would agree with Dr. Kuru that “Turkish people need mutual understanding,” but would suggest that mutual understanding does not come by denial.

Reply to criticisms (in Turkish)

Reply to criticisms in Milliyet (in Turkish)

Binnaz Toprak

Binnaz Toprak is a professor and currently Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bahcesehir University, Istanbul. Her works include the book Islam and Political Development in Turkey, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981, and two recent articles, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No.2, June 2005, 167-186, and “Economic Development versus Cultural Transformation: Projects of Modernity in Japan and Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 35, Fall, 2006, 85-128. She has also co-authored books in Turkish with Ali Çarkoğlu, including Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey), İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000; and Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey), TESEV Yayınları, 2006, translated into and English and published by TESEV, 2007, under the title Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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On the “Neighborhood Pressure”: The Review of “Being Different in Turkey: Alienation on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism” by Binnaz Toprak et al. (2008).

On November 22, 2009, I was the discussant of a panel at the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Conference, in which the panelists—Binnaz Toprak, Berna Turam, Metin Heper, and Ayşe Saktanberk—analyzed the recent debates on the “neighborhood pressure” in Turkey, a term coined by Şerif Mardin referring to the negative impact of neighborhood interactions over individual freedoms. The main survey data about this issue were collected by Prof. Toprak and her colleagues and published in Turkish with the title “Being Different in Turkey” (hereafter “the report”). My conversations with Prof. Toprak during and following the MESA panel were very helpful in the course of writing this review.

The report includes 401 interviews largely conducted with members or sympathizers of Kemalist associations, such as Republican People’s Party (CHP) and  Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri, which generally promote Turkish nationalism and  assertive secularism. Turkish nationalism is a self explanatory term. Assertive secularism may need a brief explanation. I categorize secularism into two types—assertive and passive. Assertive secularism requires the state to play an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere, whereas passive secularism demands the state to play a passive role to accommodate public visibility of religion. The former is the dominant ideology in countries such as Turkey, France, and Mexico, while the latter is prevalent in the United States, India, and the Netherlands.

The Kemalists have been concerned about the rise of pro-Islamic political, social, and economic actors in Turkey, especially since the Justice and Development (AK) Party won the elections in 2002. The report provides important insights about their concerns. Conservative political and social actors should read the report carefully, if they seek to understand how Kemalists feel about the changing dynamics of Turkey. The report may provide an opportunity for the conservatives to get a better understanding of the Kemalists and to empathize with them.

I have two main criticisms of the report. First, while analyzing the pressure over various segments of society, such as the assertive secularists, Alevis, Kurds, Christians, Gypsies, women, and youth, the report excludes only one group—conservative Sunni Muslims. This presents a negative image of conservative Muslims as if they are the only oppressive actor in Turkish society. By doing so the report ignores a) the existence of in-group repression in any segment of society, b) state and societal oppression against conservative Muslims, and c) oppression between various other groups. For example, the “ulusalcıs,” who combine assertive secularism with ultra-nationalism, is in fact the most oppressive group in today’s Turkey with their negative attitudes towards the Kurds, Armenians, Jews, and conservative Muslims.

Second, the report portrays the neighborhood pressure as a recent phenomenon and implicitly depicts the AK Party government as responsible for this new trend. Yet, it does not provide any data to show that the Turkish state and society were more tolerant in the past. At least at the state level, we know that the state brutally oppressed Alevi Kurds of Dersim in the 1930s, imposed discriminatory poll tax for Christians and Jews in the 1940s, and banned the public use of Kurdish in the 1980s. Moreover, one may argue that the recent trend in Turkey is toward more, rather than less, tolerance at governmental level as reflected in the recent “Kurdish initiative” that includes reforms such as foundation of a new public TV channel broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish.

I also have a general reservation on the recent use of the “neighborhood pressure” discourse in Turkey. If Foucault had heard of this debate, he would have asked about the relationship between power and the discourse of neighborhood pressure. Majority of women in Turkey wear some kind of headscarf. These women are not allowed to attend schools or universities, and they cannot pursue careers as civil servants or politicians. In 2008, the Turkish Parliament tried to lift the headscarf ban for university students by a constitutional amendment. The Constitutional Court struck down the amendment by arguing that the freedom to wear headscarves would create  “pressure” over those who do not wear headscarves. The report was published after the Court’s decision. Yet, it does not reflect any self-criticism or regret of the assertive secularist interviewees, in terms of the headscarf ban or other oppressions against conservative Muslims.

Turkish socio-political life has experienced a rapid change in the last decade. It would be misleading to oversimplify such a complex transformation. For example, the report repeatedly emphasizes the consumption of alcohol as an important characteristic of a secular way of life. If that was the litmus test, Turkey would become less conservative, because the total consumption of alcohol increased 5 percent from 2006 to 2007 and it increased 20 percent from 2007 to 2008 (Akşam, April 20, 2009). During this transformation process, Turkish people need mutual understanding and self-criticism, rather than cross-accusations.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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