Clearly, the protests that are shaking Turkey have very little to do with Gezi Park’s trees. What hit Istanbul first, followed by many other Turkish cities, is the backwash of institutional problems that have been lingering for decades; problems that the AKP, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party, has so far benefitted from, and has in part exacerbated.

When, in April 2007, Erdogan decided to have Abdullah Gul (one of AKP’s most important representatives) running for President, secularist circles erupted against what they perceived as a threat to one of the institutional strongholds of Turkey’s secular identity. In their view, AKP’s unilateral decision to present Gul as candidate for the position once held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was too radical a break from the tradition that saw the presidential post reserved to generals or, more recently, to political figures of Kemalist inspiration. The Turkish General Staff published a declaration on their website, reiterating the armed forces’ loyalty to the principles of Kemalism, and stressing that they were ready to intervene should such principles be violated – a critique to both AKP’s political positions, and to their attempted concentration of powers into AKP’s hands, as the party also had a solid parliamentary majority.

Shortly after the statement was published, millions of Turks hit the streets to stage a peaceful protest against Gul’s candidacy, many of them chanting “neither sharia, nor coup” – an attempt to express how they were against the potential intrusion of religion into politics, but also asking for the military, who staged four coups (with the most recent one in 1997) and are traditionally considered the guardians of secularism, to stay out of the issue. Regardless of how numerically impressive the rallies proved to be, Turkish society’s ‘silent half’ only emerged during the general elections held in July 2007, when Erdogan won with a 46% majority. The two main opposition parties, the secularist CHP and the nationalist MHP, only obtained a 20% and 14% share of votes. Subsequently, AKP MPs single-handedly elected Gul President, despite CHP’s and MHP’s opposition.

What we see on Turkish streets today has some commonalities with what happened in 2007; however, over the last few years some fundamental changes have also took place. Erdogan has been elected for the third time in 2011, with 49% of votes. CHP has attempted to reshape itself, replacing its traditionalist leader Deniz Baykal with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who, on paper, was supposed to bring new ideas and new energies into the party. But a real change was never achieved, and after an underwhelming electoral result in 2011 (25%), CHP has progressively backpedalled towards more traditionalist and Kemalism-centric positions.

In the meantime, military circles were shook by the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, which focus on an alleged clandestine network that, according to prosecutors, has been operating since AKP’s first victory in 2002 in order to facilitate and eventually stage a military coup. The imprisonment of hundreds of military officers had the consequence of delegitimizing, at least temporarily, the military’s footprint in Turkey’s domestic politics, curbing their influence. Over the last years, those more critic towards the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases have defended the hypothesis that the trials would in fact be a mere purge against the armed forces, AKP’s arch-enemy, as well as against the most staunch voices from the opposition, as dozens of journalists jailed due to charges based on opinions expressed on the Turkish media.

The political crisis of 2007 already reduced the military’s political expectations, as they had to take a step back when faced by the overwhelming majority Erdogan obtained through the ballot box; moreover, generals were also aware that none of the alternatives to an AKP government would have guaranteed Turkey’s political stability. Regardless of the extent to which the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases are legitimate, the detentions that were carried out over the last years (about 400 military officers are currently behind bars) played a significant role in isolating the most radical members of the armed forces, and in reducing the general’s influence.

After having consolidated his political power, reduced the military’s political influence, and kept criticism at bay, Erdogan achieved ideal conditions to push AKP’s political agenda ahead without any problem. The protests of Gezi Park want to address this convergence of powers towards Erdogan, his idea of a democracy that should express itself only through elections, and his increasingly confrontational attitude and refusal to accept dialogue. The few activists that first occupied Gezi Park a few days ago were dealt with by the police through a disproportionate use of force, in what became the brutal crackdown of a peaceful protest. That event turned into the boiling point for a large share of Turkey’s society, who, over the last months, felt like Erdogan was running a one-man show. The fact that the Turkish media purposely ignored the protests (turning CNNTurk’s penguins into a powerful symbol) did nothing but further radicalising the protest, exposing even more how the Turkish system is suffering from a concentration of powers and from the lack of a functioning system of formal and informal checks and balances.

Among those protesting, a small minority has been calling for the military to intervene; however, their expectations clash against the lack of political and social conditions that triggered military interventions in the past. On the contrary, the protester’s vast majority claims decisional autonomy on a range of social issues on which Erdogan demands sole authority – just what military juntas did in the past. Erdogan’s rough style has simply triggered protests that have been lingering for quite some time among AKP opponents – and those who expected a more moderate AKP alike.

However, Erdogan’s electoral weight should not be overlooked. Since 2002, general elections systematically turned into quasi-plebiscites for his party, while the CHP has regularly lagged behind, and the 10% threshold kept smaller parties from emerging. From the position of strength he gained over the last ten years, and being well aware of Turkey’s political dynamics, Erdogan showed a defiant stance towards the ongoing protests. He also accused the international media, social networks, and foreign secret services of (respectively) having provided biased and false information, and of having fuelled protests to destabilise his government.

We can see two different ideals of democracy clashing in Turkey today. On one side, the ideal held by that part of society who protests against a model that, recent democratic achievements notwithstanding, still maintains the rigid and centralised structure that the Constitution (written by the military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup) embeds. On the other there is Erdogan, his political project, and the ‘silent’ part of society that supports him.

The original version of this analysis can be found (in Italian) on Aspenia Online, Mideast Flashpoint

]]> http://changingturkey.com/2013/06/07/two-ideals-of-democracy-clashing-in-turkey-by-francesco-f-milan/feed/ 0 Changing Turkey occupy-gezi-protests-june-1 http://changingturkey.com/2013/06/06/turkish-spring-occupy-gezi-by-dr-ozan-ormeci/ http://changingturkey.com/2013/06/06/turkish-spring-occupy-gezi-by-dr-ozan-ormeci/#comments Thu, 06 Jun 2013 12:25:59 +0000 Changing Turkey http://changingturkey.com/?p=2893 ]]> By Dr. Ozan Örmeci (Girne American University, Cyprus) 

A small environmentalist protest that started on 28 May 2013 in order to protect one of the rare green areas in Taksim called “Gezi Park” surprisingly turned into a massive social movement in Turkey this week. Although the Turkish media -probably because of government’s pressures- did not seem willingly to publish news about the anti-government demonstrations in the early days, after a huge interest shown by the international media, demonstrations became very popular in the country and spread to all “metropolis” cities in Turkey including İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Nowadays, there are discussions in Turkish and international media about whether these peaceful and democratic demonstrations could turn into a “Turkish Spring” similar to Arab Spring movements. In this article, I would like to take a closer look to “Occupy Gezi” movement and analyze the reasons that gave birth to this event.

When we take a closer look to events taking place in Turkey, it is not surprising to see that the driving force behind this social movement is the fear of secular-minded Turkish people towards the increasing Islamist, authoritarian and one-man based political practices of the ruling JDP (Justice and Development Party) government. Just two weeks ago, the government by using its majority in Turkish Grand National Assembly, passed a controversial law limiting the sale and the use of alcohol in the country. This was followed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements defending this law with making reference to Islamic holy book Qur’an, a clear violation of secularism principle of the Turkish constitution. Maybe for the first time in Turkish political history, a politician defended his political positioning solely by religious reference, an unusual practice for secular Turks. In addition, Erdoğan blamed founders of secular Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü as “two drunkards”, which created enormous anger among Westernized segments of the country towards the pro-Islamic Prime Minister. These events were perceived as government’s interference into private sphere and direct intervention to people’s lives.

Second important reason behind massive social movement was the excessive use of force by Turkish policemen, a historical national habit for Turkish armed bureaucracy. Although in the early days, participation into demonstrations were very limited and ecology-based in its essence, harsh methods used by Turkish police towards peaceful demonstrations created anger among Turkish people especially among Turkish youth and transformed “Occupy Gezi” into a social revolutionary movement.

Thirdly, it is no coincidence to see that environmentalism and ecological issues are still seen very marginal and unimportant issues by the JDP government and generally by all Turkish political parties and politicians. However, Westernized and better-educated segments of the country have started to show increasing interest into environmentalist issues in the last years. Thus, Gezi Park is perceived as a last castle in Taksim Square and the government’s intention to destroy the park triggered environmentalist sensitivities.

Fourthly, events were organized by young Turkish citizens using social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter, a modern youth having knowledge and conscience about Western standards of democracy and Turkey’s lack of having it. Technological revolution of the last decade became a convenient tool for suppressed groups to defend their views for radical democracy, as it was seen in the case of Jasmine and Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2012. The use of social media turned demonstrations into a protest youth organization reminding the 1968 generation and Woodstock festivals of the past. However, after Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement describing Twitter as a “headache for countries”, yesterday Turkish police started to arrest students who use social media to organize these events.

Fifthly, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s arrogant response to protesters by saying “We took a decision and no matter what you do, we will remove this park from there” as well as “These are marginalized bandit groups” made the demonstrations even stronger. As Erdoğan spoke, the number of people who joined the demonstrations increased. Erdoğan, starting from the early days of his career, has always preferred a daily life language in his speeches in order to seem like a “leader coming out of people from the streets”, but his rude style of speech continues to irritate better educated people in the country. This time, the hatred towards Erdoğan’s Islamic populist style seems to reach the highest point among secular segments of the country.

These reasons led to a popular social movement and crowded demonstrations that gathered people from different identities (environmentalists, anti-capitalist leftist and Islamic groups, liberals, gay and lesbians, Kemalists, Kurds) together. Although this heterogeneous group does not possess a strict common ideology, one thing makes them unified; being against Erdoğan’s authoritarian and Islamist one-man rule. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan, instead of decreasing the tension, chose to insult young people and this social movement and proved once again that he is not a man of negotiations but of dictating. The demands of the protesters could be stated as the protection of Gezi Park, government’s respect and guarantee for different lifestyles, stopping of police brutality and resignation of Prime Minister Erdoğan. In fact, first three demands could be easily realized but Erdoğan probably won’t make such a thing because of his jihadist worldview that considers democratic negotiations and agreements as defeats.

As a close observer of Erdoğan, I can say that although these demonstrations were promising for the future, the weakness of Turkey’s pro-secular political parties -namely social democratic Republican People’s Party and Turkish nationalist Nationalist Action Party- will probably make Erdoğan even more angry and authoritarian in the following days. Erdoğan clearly believes in Rousseau type of majoritarian democracy and he does not see any problem about Islamic and authoritarian transformation of the country as long as he wins in the elections. After the elimination of pro-secular Turkish Armed Forces in the recent years, Erdoğan will continue to use his majority in the Parliament to make the regime more Islamic and will leave little space for pluralism. No matter how hard he tries to cover it, Erdoğan is a radical Islamist who wants to establish an Islamic political system and he won’t stop until he is out of the scene. Erdoğan takes his power from uneducated masses and he is like a rock star for pious Turkish and Kurdish people. He has managed to survive until now, although his foreign policy with the aspirations of creating a new Ottoman Empire became troubled vis-a-vis Syrian crisis. Thus, dethroning “Sultan Erdoğan” does not seem easy for the opposition groups at least for the moment. In addition, Erdoğan is the mastermind of polarized politics and until now he has won 3 general (2002, 2007, 2011) and 2 local elections (2004, 2009), as well as 2 referendums by polarizing the society within the lines of secularist-Islamist dichotomy. That is why, these events may not weaken but consolidate Erdoğan’s regime.

The only barrier for Erdoğan could be the negative economic performance of the country in the near future, which could raise questions about the success of his regime. Establishment of a new liberal political party that could unify all these opposing groups and new social actors in the country could also be a chance for the deepening and more pessimistically for the survival of Turkish democracy. Finally, in my opinion what has been happening in Turkey is different from Arab Spring movements since Turkey has a flawed -but still- democracy. However, at the same time I also think that there is no mistake in calling this process as “Turkish Spring” since this is a new sociopolitical process driven by the politicization of Western lifestyles of modern Turkish youth with the use of new technological tools, which could help Turkey to deepen its democracy and get rid of Islamic authoritarianism in the future.

On May 27, 2013 the protests in Taksim Gezi Park were launched by environmentalists in order to preserve the park from the Turkish authorities, who want to reconstruct the previously demolished Ottoman military barracks that would also include a shopping mall inside the building. Protests started with a cry to preserve the limited green area left in Istanbul and turned into a democratic protest series all over Turkey. Increasing police violence against peaceful demonstrators, which was kept secret from the public by censorship of the mainstream media and reached to a number of people through non-mainstream and new social media, touched hearts of many and drove them to the streets.  Demonstrations spread all over Turkey and attracted increasing support day to day from different segments of society. Students, artists, academicians, public workers, and many from different profession, social class and with different political orientation cried the main slogan of the protest “Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance”. The slogan demonstrates the reason of the spill over of protests in all over Turkey. People felt compelled to resist ‘something’. People were fed up with ‘something’. ‘Something’ united people with different backgrounds and political ideology. Although ‘something’ changes from person to person in the protests (e.g., alcohol ban, education reform, environmental problems, censorship), I would say, all united on one matter: democracy. The protesters were united against the repressive tendencies demonstrated by the AKP government and for the desire for democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms. As the Minister of Education and Justice and Development Party (AKP) Member of Parliament, Nabi Avci, states, “These events demonstrated how we are successful and capable as the government. We achieved something, the opposition could not have achieved however they try, in five days. We caused the union of different segments of society that can not be imagined to unite in all circumstances.” Interestingly, the people of Turkey seem to adopt the official motto of the European Union in the domestic arena despite the train crash in the EU accession process: “unity in diversity”. People of Turkey united against “something!” and chanted “resistance for democracy, resistance for freedoms!”

Dr Didem Buhari-Gulmez (co-editor of ChangingTurkey.com)

Turkey’s single-party government formed by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) is in power since 2002. Its success  according to many relies upon its claim to expand individual freedoms and reverse the Sevres syndrome, which refers to the establishment’s paranoia against foreign invasion and domestic threats –such as ethnic and religious minorities and  political Islamists.

However, in 11 years, the JDP government has gradually ‘absorbed’ (for ‘absorption’ of veto players, see Tsebelis 2002:28) or invalidated the majority of the key veto players in the domestic arena such as the Presidency of the Republic, Constitutional Court, media, army, YOK and OSYM institutions responsible for national education, civil society, business associations, and Ombudsman.  While the weakening of the military’s political authority was generally seen as a positive step by Turkish citizens, the European Union and the international community, the insertion of JDP members and supporters to Turkey’s Presidency, Constitutional Court, mainstream media, and YOK have created much controversy. Plus, the country’s EU membership prospects seem to fade quickly since 2005 after the EU’s decision to partially halt the accession negotiations until Turkey ‘normalizes’ its relations with Cyprus.

There are several reasons for the eruption and severity of the Gezi Park demonstrations which have quickly spread to other cities gathering thousands of people from all walks of life and ideological stances. Take for instance the widespread claims of fraud in municipal and general elections and in nation-wide tests that are used to recruit judges, policemen, teachers, and scholars in favour of JDP supporters. Add to this the JDP government’s insensitivity and intolerance to any criticisms against its urban policies and its political agenda (interpreted by many as ‘too Islamist’). Even, the EU’s loss of leverage on Turkey can be seen as a contributing factor. Overall, the eruption and development of Gezi Park protests can be explained as an inevitable consequence of the lack of efficient channels through which political dissent could be expressed in Turkey. Public outrage against the mainstream media which turned a blind eye to the demonstrations confirms this.

The press statements of the Turkish Prime Minister were unfortunately very similar to an infamous speech given by the son of Muammar Gaddafi during the public protests in Libya, known as ‘Rivers of Blood’ (20/2/2011, Al-Jazeera English). During his speech, Saif Gaddafi claimed that the protesters were drunk and ignorant young people who were instruments at the hands of foreign powers. Similarly, Erdogan chose to remain defiant and called the Turkish protesters alcoholic ‘bums’ before denouncing a foreign plot against Turkey. Social media which has significantly empowered Turkish citizens (who still continue protesting despite excessive use of force by police) has thus been identified as a key ‘trouble-maker’ by Erdogan who frowns upon foreign journalists asking questions about social media information that challenges the official accounts. Supporters of the Erdogan cabinet have already started to accuse the protesters for undermining Turkey’s international prestige and its attractiveness for foreign investment. Rather than focusing upon material gains and losses relative to the external world, the World Society approach developed by John W. Meyer at Stanford University emphasizes the significance of global legitimacy for national politics and society (Meyer 2010). If a policy is not legitimate in the global context, its practice is not possible no matter how much the national society sees it as an important tradition (for the case of female genital cutting –see Elizabeth Boyle 2002).  International community may be weak in terms of material pressures (like sanctioning national governments which fail to guarantee human rights) but world society indicates the (de)legitimating authority of the global sphere. In this context, legitimacy is not reducible to a ‘policy consensus among great powers’ nor to Court decisions (Clark 2005: 16).

‘Auto-legitimation is an oxymoron –an actor can jump up and down, declaring loudly that his or her actions are legitimate, but if nobody accepts this, then they are not correctly described as such, even if he or she is making a legitimacy claim’ (Reus-Smit 2007: 159).

In a world which is increasingly interconnected, people in different parts of the world do care about the moral judgments of others about what are legitimate acts both in their own lands and on a transnational level (Etzioni 2011: 122).

We can talk about a global sphere that informs our legitimacy decisions about our own actions and those of others. It is notable that legitimacy is not exclusively driven by the external world; it takes into account ‘the experienced reality of the audience’s daily life’ (Suchman 1995: 582) because:

…the fragmented and often conflictual nature of the larger cultural terrain frequently creates gaps in which actors can select among pre-existing (but not necessarily consistent) logics (Suchman 1995: 589).

What we are currently witnessing is a struggle over (global) legitimacy between the Turkish protesters and the government authorities. By using social media, Turkish protesters try to reach the world society and secure global support against what they perceive as state authoritarianism. For its part, the Turkish government defends itself by saying that it is a legitimately elected government which pursues policies that are in compliance with globally accepted standards and that the protesters are misleading the international community. Pay attention to what the credible foreign experts on Turkey who personally witness the events are saying/tweeting/writing. They are likely to be the final ‘impartial’ authorities that will answer the question of who is legitimate in its claims and demands. The current picture suggests that in order to placate the rising concerns at both home and abroad, the governmental authorities will need to (1) revise their narrow understanding of democracy and human rights; (2) deal with the Sevres syndrome within their ranks; and (3) grasp that national governments in the modern democratic world are not only accountable to a domestic constituency but also to an external community that trespasses nationalistic understandings and boundaries.

References

Boyle, Elisabeth H. (2002) Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global Community. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, Ian (2005). Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Etzioni A (2011) On Communitarian and Global Sources of Legitimacy. The Review of Politics 73(1):105–122.

Gaddafi, Saif (2011) ‘Rivers of Blood’, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eL6I5hktEs0

Meyer, John W. (2010) World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 1-20.

Reus-Smit C (2007) International Crises of Legitimacy. International Politics 44(1):157–174.

Suchman, Mark C. (1995) Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. Academy of Management Review 20(3):571–610.

Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

In the 8^th day of the occupation, the Park has already turned into a small campsite with its make-shift infirmaries, pharmacies, library, kitchens and information center. Although the international media label the protestors as ‘seculars’ and the government officials continue to call them as fringe groups, the “residents” of Gezi Park in Taksim square include people with different socio-economic, religious and ethnic backgrounds, i.e. leftists and anti-capitalist pious Muslims, Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, Gender minorities, artists and students. It is also important to note here that there are also those who voted for the incumbent Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the elections among the activists. As a result, calling the Gezi events as a clash between those against JDP and the government is misguiding.

The Park turned into a symbol for the problems in the quality of democracy in Turkey. The narrow understanding of democracy that put excessive importance to electoral politics, the opposition parties’ inability to communicate the needs and demands of their constituency, the increasing perception of compromises, accommodations, and negotiations to create legitimate policies in a parliamentary system as weaknesses, along with the de facto censorship of the press and the excessive use of force by the police pave the way for the increase in unconventional forms of citizen action in Turkey. The yearn for deliberative democracy, the fear of losing basic rights and liberties, and the increasing environmental concerns due to the urban renovation and Hydroelectric dam projects are factors that drive the protestors to demonstrate all over Turkey.

Even though the specifics of the demands vary, all actors involved so far stress on the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech and expression. But what the people in Gezi Park want first is to prevent the destruction of the park. It does not make a difference whether or not they intent to build a hotel, a shopping mall or a museum. The residents and the activists want to keep all the trees and the park intact, and want to be a part of the decision-making processes. Additionally, the protestors in Turkey in general want transparency in decision-making processes and exercise their fundamental rights and liberties. They also want a free press that can provide unbiased and continuous information flow, rather than showing documentaries, soap operas, beauty pageants or pro-government programs. Whether or not the JDP in general and PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular will listen and negotiate with the demonstrators – at least with those in Gezi Park – is another matter. One thing is certain in the short-run the occupation of Gezi Park will continue.

1. The reaction of the Turkish Diaspora is very significant. The Turkish Diaspora has been key to Turkey’s ability to pursue its interests around the world, especially in the US. Now the Turkish Diaspora appears to have actively mobilized in public demonstrations around the world against the Turkish government – which may diminish the fervor and enthusiasm of the Turkish Diaspora to support Turkey’s interests in the future (such as in connection with legislative matters in the US Congress of concern to Turkey). Time will tell whether this will be the case.

2. What is impressive is the outpouring of political expression in Turkey. The political opposition (especially the opposition political parties) has been weak and not united. The Gezi protests may presage the development of a wide movement, across the political spectrum, in opposition to the government. The question is whether this will (or can) be translated into success at the ballot box.

3. Lastly, the emergence of President Gul as a moderating voice and influence is also an extremely important aspect of these events. His influence on Turkish politics may be increased as a result of his actions surrounding these events.

As you may know, for more than a decade, many renewal projects have been realized in Istanbul and several of them have been conceived in a non democratic way with top-down decisions resulting on forced displacement of many inhabitants. There are several organizations which struggled against these projects and called for mobilization against the destruction of trees in Gezi Park on 27^th May. However, the violent police treatment of these peaceful protesters provoked a deep indignation in Turkish society and a huge number of people decided to support and to meet for Gezi Resistance. Activists in Gezi Park express clearly their will to be part of the decisions concerning their city and oppose the neo-liberalization of their life spaces via the for-profit destruction of forests, rivers and public lands. They don’t want Istanbul transformed to a giant skyscrapers park.

If the action spread throughout Turkey, this is not only because of the trees of Gezi Park. This is also related to many clashes happening in Turkey since last month between the government and a part of the society. The ban of Taksim Square to the Labor Day demonstrations, bomb attack in Reyhanlı causing 55 deaths and the neglecting attitude of the primary minister after the event, the law on the prohibition of alcohol sale and consumption and the general bumptious attitude of Tayyip Erdogan vis-à-vis his opponents, declaring always the support of 50 % of society for himself provoked also these mobilizations. We should not forget the police violence against peaceful demonstrators (2 people died, more than 500 people injured, at least 10 people lost their eyes because of tear gas canisters).

Now, the government of Erdoğan knows that everything will not be as easy as before. 50 % of support in the society doesn’t mean that you can do everything you want in a democracy; it is not an empty check. For the protesters, this is also time to think about the construction of a real institutional opposition in order to break down the idea of Tayyip Erdoğan who seems to be persuaded that his place is guaranteed as there is no leader able to challenge him in political arena.

As ChangingTurkey.com, we would like to inform our audience about the latest Turkey-wide mass protests against the government. With this motivation, we expect you to send your informed opinion on the GEZI demonstrations in one or two paragraphs. Upon request, we will not show your full name but write “Anonymous scholar from …” instead.

Below are some of the questions you might want to tackle in your piece:

• Why did these protests occur?

• Why now?

• Why have the GEZI demonstrations spread to all over Turkey?

• Who are the protesters?

• Why do they demonstrate?

• What are the possible implications of these protests?

You are not limited to these questions.

We would be delighted to publish your opinion on the GEZI demonstrations.

Please send your views to changingturkey@gmail.com

Important notice: This is a call exclusively for scholars and experts.

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Applications are invited for one postdoctoral fellowship in a research project on “The Eurozone Crisis and the Politicization of European Integration”, directed by Professor Achim Hurrelmann. The project will analyze the implications of the Eurozone crisis for democratic politics in the European Union by examining political discourses in national parliaments, the news media, and focus groups in four member states (Germany, Austria, Ireland, and Spain).

Under the supervision of the project director, the postdoctoral fellow will primarily be responsible for research on the cases of Spain and Ireland. He/she will also play a leading role in preparing some of the conference presentations and publications emerging from the project. In addition, he/she will have access to project data for independent research activities.

Eligibility: PhD (or equivalent doctoral degree) in Political Science or a related discipline. The PhD must have been completed after September 1, 2011. Applications from scholars who will complete their degree by February 28, 2014 are eligible.

Period of appointment: September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2015.

Compensation: $40,000 per annum. The fellow will be provided with office space and will have access to limited project funds for conference participation.

Qualifications:

*         Dissertation and/or research experience in the field of European Union politics;

*         Familiarity with academic debates about the politicization and/or legitimation of European integration;

*         Experience with methods of media and discourse analysis;

*         Record of academic publications;

*         Expert knowledge of Spanish required; knowledge of German an asset.

The following materials should be submitted:

*         CV and list of publications;

*         English language writing sample (published article/chapter or manuscript);

*         Transcripts of degrees and other relevant documents;

*         Two letters of reference, in a sealed envelope or sent directly by the referees.

Please send your application per mail or email to the following address:

Achim Hurrelmann

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

1125 Colonel By Drive

Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada

achim_hurrelmann@carleton.ca

Between Enmity and Amity

Edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Ashgate, 2013)

In 1997 Turkey and Syria were on the brink of war, engaged in a very real power struggle. Turkey was aligned with Syria’s main enemy, Israel, and there were seemingly intractable differences on the issues of borders, the sharing of river waters and trans-border communities. In less than a decade, relations were transformed from enmity to amity. Border issues and water sharing quarrels were moving towards amicable settlement and the two states’ policies toward the Kurdish issue converging. Turkey undertook to mediate the Syrian-Israeli conflict and close political and economic relations were developing rapidly between the two states. Yet, with the Syrian Uprising, relations returned to enmity

What explains these remarkable changes? Given that Turkey and Syria are two pivotal states in the region, what are the implications of this changing relationship for the international politics of the Middle East, the balance of power and regional stability?

In this internationally collaborative work, co-edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, British, Syrian and Turkish scholars address these questions and examine the various domestic and international drivers in this key regional relationship. They discuss what theories best help us understand these seismic realignments and explore the impact of economic interdependence, identity changes and power balances on the evolving relationship between these two key regional powers.

Contents: 

Preface; Introduction: the study of Turkey-Syria relations, Raymond Hinnebusch; Ripeness theory and coercive diplomacy as a road to conflict resolution: the case of the Turkey-Syria showdown in 1998, Berna Süer; Syrian-Turkish relations: geopolitical explanations for the move from conflict to co-operation, Marwan Kalaban; Turkey’s Cold War alliance: nation -building and the utility of the 1957 Syrian crisis, Reem Abou-El-Fadl; Paradise lost: a neoclassical realist analysis of Turkish foreign policy and the case of Turkish-Syrian relations, Ahmet K. Han; ‘Milking the male goat’ and Syrian-Turkish relations, Sami Moubayed; ‘Victory of friendship’? Assad, Erdogan and football diplomacy in Aleppo, Philip Robins; As seen from Damascus: the transformation in Syrian-Turkish relations, Samir al-Taqi and Raymond Hinnebusch; The importance of the unimportant: understanding Syrian policies towards Hatay 1939-2012, Emma Lundgren Jörum; Ethnicity, religion and foreign policy: Turkish-Syrian relations since the 1980s, Yasemin Akbaba and Özgür Özdamar; Back to conflict? The securitization of water in Syrian-Turkish relations, Marwa Daoudy; Turkey-Syria water relations: institutional development and political confrontations in the Euphrates and Tigris region, Aysegül Kibaroglu; The political economy of Turkish-Syrian relations in the 2000s – the rise and fall of trade, investment and integration, Özlem Tür; Explaining the transformation of Turkish-Syrian relations: a regionalist approach, Meliha Benli Altunisik; The Syrian uprising and the Iran-Turkey-Syria quasi alliance: a view from Turkey, Özden Zeynep Oktav; Conclusion, Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür; Bibliography; Index.

About the Editor: 

Raymond Hinnebusch is Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, co-founder of the Institute for the study of the Middle East, Central Asian and the Caucasus and Director of the Centre for Syrian Studies.

Dr. Özlem Tür is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Her main expertise includes the political economy of the Middle East, Arab-Israeli Conflict and Turkey’s relations with the Middle East (especially Syria, Israel and Lebanon).

Reviews: 

‘As Turkey turns toward the Middle East, relations with Syria mark the front line where simmering conflicts with Kurdish nationalists and Iran intersect with blossoming economic opportunities across the Levant and Gulf. This impressive collection explores crucial aspects of the relationship, from divergent state-building strategies to often-overlooked sporting events, and explains pivotal events using sophisticated theories of world politics.’ Fred H. Lawson, Mills College, USA

‘This book looks into one of the most understudied bilateral relationships within the Middle East sub-system of the post 9/11 world, i.e. Turkey-Syria; providing comprehensive assessments from an extremely informative multinational group of authors, using a variety of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives, and levels of analysis. It contributes to the understanding of foreign policy analysis literature by insisting that the best way to study it might be to incorporate the multiple dimensions of rival IR theories and to look at the interrelations between them rather than arguing for the exclusivity of one.’  Mustafa Aydın, Kadir Has University, Turkey