Changing Turkey in a Changing World

By Abdihakim Aynte

Somalian researcher

email: abdihakim.aynte@gmail.com

Abdihakim Aynte is currently the president of Somali Forum for Progress, an independent think-tank initiative based in Mogadishu, Somalia.

In what seems to be an extraordinary shift in its involvement in Africa, Turkey is fast becoming an ally – and international actor – in Somalia’s theater. Lately, Ankara has shown an increasing interest and willingness to intervene to the devastating situation caused by the acute drought, complicated by terrorism and statelessness in Somalia. In the midst of biblical famine that starved millions of Somalis to death, Turkey was the first country to unilaterally respond to the drought, while traditional donors for Somalia were unable and unwilling to provide more than a fleeting aid package. There are, perhaps, three essential factors that can be attributed to Ankara’s principled approach to Somalia: Moral authority that defines Ankara’s Islamic values; business opportunity that makes Turkey a raising global economic competitor and geo-strategic vision that is part of Ankara’s global roundabout ambition – a roundabout of different ideas, cultural, business, people and innovation.

For two decades, Somalia has been plagued by continuous warfare, recurrent humanitarian disasters, terrorism, and statelessness. The international community, for its discredit, has been reconfiguring Somalia’s solution for the last two decades, but never succeeded one. The latest pact of such an attempt was just concluded in London, where 50 head of international states, including Turkey, assembled in a one day conference orchestrated by British government, to reset a fresh tone on Somalia. To top it off, Somalia is fragmented into a multitude of ethnic lines with plenty of transitional governments that are internally paralyzed by stalemates and political bickering. The country is lacking strong central government since the fall of Siyad Barre regime, and the infrastructure is almost totally collapsed.

In a polemic essay by Erdoğan at Foreign Policy after his trip to Mogadishu, he mildly slammed the international community for their mortal failure in Somalia, letting the country become its own drama that is going to nowhere. Contrast to that view, Turkey has strenuously – and more modestly – approached the crisis in Somalia, rather than promises and plans as other donors did, and made significant inroads that were not seen before. Turkey, at the crossroad of civilizations between East and West, has put itself forward as a fellow Muslim nation who, unlike other Muslim countries, cares about what happens in Somalia partly because of the religious and historical ties.

Historic Visit, Galvanizing Somalia

When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was visiting Mogadishu on Friday 19 August 2011 in a well remembered visit, most of the cheering crowds who waited for him at the airport barely knew who Erdoğan was, but recognized his face through the posters of Erdoğan that were pitched all over the Adden Airport.  This is a gentle reminder of how ordinary Somalis are alienated towards foreign leaders and disconnected from technology.

The visit marked an important mission as Erdoğan was the first leader to brave into Mogadishu, arguably among the most dangerous cities over the past two decades, whilst most of the international donors are on the periphery capably unable to make more than a fleeting visit.  Erdoğan’s visit also marked an awkward position within the so called “international community.” Ankara is unilaterally taking a risk in Somalia, a country that has been dismally bungled by outsiders, and driven upon its moral authority rather than its superior mighty.

Moreover, after his meeting with President Shiekh Sharif at Villa Somalia, Erdoğan immediately instructed the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu for the first time in 20 years, to assign a new ambassador who submitted his credentials on the same day as a subtle proof of Ankara’s urgency on its local representative. In the days that followed Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey alone pledged 250 million USD in humanitarian relief assistance. The magnitude of the Somalian tragedy – that the UN estimated as 3.2 million people who are in a dire situation – deserved an enormous international consolidation appeal.

Prior to his visit, Erdoğan’s picture – or Turkish’s flag – became commonly visible throughout Mogadishu. By most measures, the visit was symbolically historic: it coincided with holy Ramadan, red carpet and honor guards and gun sluts were set out for Erdoğan – the first gesture in 20 years seen by Somalis. Erdoğan defied the UN categorization of Mogadishu as an unsafe and no-go-zone. In nutshell, his visit warmed the hearts and the minds of many proud Somalis, both inside and outside, who infatuated Erdoğan’s trip as, in their own words, “Somali’s only true Muslim friend”.

What made Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia particularly a groundbreaking is that, unlike other visitors, who routinely make brief appearances on the ground, typically confined to military bases; Erdoğan drove into the city, toured around refugee camps, took pictures with underfed kids, – a motion even Ban ki Moon, UN’s Secretary who visited Somalia after Erdoğan, failed to show, and galvanized the whole plight of Somalia.

Historic Ties, Fellow Muslim Nation

Practically, Turkey’s most recent involvement in Somalia can be linked to its 2010′s conference on Somali business communities in Istanbul. Before the summit, Ankara’s interest in Somalia was quite marginal. Turkish interest in Somalia, however, is not new. Both countries have historic relations that dates way back to the Ottoman Empire. Somalia had an extensive relationship with the Ottoman Empire during the Sultan Selim rule in 1517. In the most recent history, Turkey helped Somalia during the US led operation called Operation Restore Hope, also infamously known as Black Hawk Down Operation, and had sent battalion of Turkish army under the auspices of the UN and reestablished cultural and educational facilities in Mogadishu. Turkey’s contingent used to distribute milks, food and beverages to schools and madrasas in Somalia, a sign of maintaining its old relations with Somalis. Through the years, Turkey, the only Muslim member in NATO, and Somalia has maintained a cozy relationship.

Prime Minister Erdoğan’s decision to bring his wife Emine, and five key ministries with limited security detail to visit Mogadishu, days after al-Shabab was driven out of Mogadishu city, gave unprecedented validity to the Turkish efforts and reinforced the popular theory that Turkey is distinctly – and uniquely – a reliable fellow Muslim nation that can elevate global awareness on Somali’s plight. Turkey’s principled approached helped to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence between Somalis and Turkish as whole.

Not everyone is happy about Turkey’s new engagement in Somalia as critics differ on Turkey’s involvement. In one camp’s view is that Ankara’s modern engagement in Africa amounts to reviving the “neo-Ottoman” heritage that has profound root in Somalia. Another critic, but perhaps more incendiary, accuses Turkish government for naively pumping direct cash to Somalia government, who is widely considered as a bunch of syndicate corrupted officials. Ankara, for its own good, has undermined this allegation and extensively nurtured its relations with Mogadishu.

Making Difference     

The policies towards Somalia have focused on alleviating the situation for those affected by the drought. But with thousands of IDPs (please indicate the long version) coming to Mogadishu and with a will to reflect more than the short term possibilities of saving lives, Turkey has also noticed “that you cannot sustain Somalia by simply providing food and medicine.” To this end, Turkey has expressed desire to participate and contribute to initiatives that are aimed at rebuilding the country. In this commitment, Turkey has launched a bilateral support for Somali by providing aid in critical sectors like health, education, roads, garbage storage facilities, sanitary system, airports and more importantly, building Somali national army. “The ultimate aim of these projects are institutional building and make Somalia self-sufficient”, said Mr. Bekir Bozdağ, Turkish deputy prime minister who was also visiting Mogadishu last week to announce Turkish flights. More compassionately, Turkey is available for free medical support to those effected October 4, 2011, heinous attack in Mogadishu which sadly claimed the lives of some 100 students, lined up for scholarship exams to Turkey. Shortly after the attack, Turkey dispatched an emergency plane to carry the victims to Turkey for specialized medical treatment.

The Turkish role in Somalia has grown consistently since last Augusts’ visit. A development office was established in Mogadishu, with the effect that both the Turkish government and its non-governmental organizations can fearlessly arrive in Mogadishu – a city that even the Nairobi crowed UN agencies have categorized as no-go-zone since the civil war. Moreover, two new offices, one in Puntland and one in Somaliland, are to be opened within a short period of time. Furthermore, Turkish Airlines have introduced a regular flight – twice a week – to Mogadishu via Sudan, a clear indication that Turkey is open for business opportunities. From Turkey’s perspective, a stable, viable and reliable ally in the Horn of Africa, preferably Muslim nation, is critically important with economic calculations.

In Somalia, Turkey is rebuilding the social fabrics by reconstructing roads, airports, hospitals for Somali peoples’ wellbeing and paving the way for political resettlement. The list of some projects that Turkey is doing in Somalia is encouraging: up to 1000 students have been granted full scholarships in different fields in Turkey, schools that teaches Turkish language have open up, Turkish Red Crescent feeds up to 15,000 IDPs, a major hospital and outpatient clinic have been reconstructed which benefiting nearly three million Somalis coming from Mogadishu and other remote areas. The net effect of Turkey’s contribution to the impoverished country of Somalia is mind-boggling.  For the first time in two decades, Somalia is receiving global attention that might make a difference for the better.

New Ally and Mediator

Lately, there have also been reports that Turkey has been clandestinely establishing some line of communication between al-Shabaab, an Islamist organization that paid allegiance to al-Qeada, and Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This underscores Turkey’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role in the mediation process. To be sure, Turkey has notable advantages in mediation, including its historical connection to Somalia, notwithstanding its shared Islamic values and its lack of local proxies or other incentives to meddle in the internal politics. In addition, Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign minister recently outlined Turkey’s interest in meditating between the conflicting parties in Somalia and asserted that “despite our advantage and special relation with Somalis of all stripes, Turkey would play a role in mediating conflicting parties in Somalia.”

In light of this unorthodox approach to Somalia, what possibilities does the Turkish engagement show for long term positive development in the country? Could Turkish engagement prove to be the catalyst for nation building that is much needed in this fragmented country? The method with which Ankara is approaching Somalia is undoubtedly one to envy. It screams of pragmatism, of hope, of a country that dares to aim for development before the outcome of the political unrest is settled. If implemented properly, public goods, such as garbage cleaning, may not only help Mogadishu to become a cleaner environment but could also provide a fruitful basis for cooperation between the districts in Mogadishu and their respective leaders. Similar actions have previously shown to provide a good basis for conflict prevention in other parts of the world.

Needless to say, Turkey has aptly proved to be a capable of delivering what many international donors failed to deliver in 20 years – relief, rebuilding and resettlement. A major question in the backdrop of the London conference is what will happen now that many other countries possibly also want to take part in Somali development? While Turkey has a long history of approaching the EU, and is possibly aiming to become a member state in the relative close future, Turkish actions in the recent past shows that it will not bend its position just to satisfy the wishes of major EU powers. In order to avert possible clashes of interests between Turkey and other stakeholders, which is likely, there is a need for donor cooperation. The future of the Somali state building process needs “donor stability”. In this process, Turkey should be the go-to actor for international actors interested in the aspects of development where Turkey has already made significant difference.

It is increasingly apparent that Turkey’s expressed interest in Somalia is far more than mere lip service to score extra credit in relation to a possible EU membership. In the future of Somali’s state building, Turkey should play an active role, benefiting from the trust it has gained amongst Somalis and its exceptional position of being a Muslim fellow. The international community, for its part, should recognize Turkey for its humanitarian model in Somalia. Here it remains to be seen to what degree other nations will be willing and able to cooperate with Turkey’s relentless efforts, and to what degree Turkey will feel that other nations intervene in their territory.

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Rosa Öktem holds a dual degree from the universities of Cologne and Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and an LL.M. in Human Rights Law from Queen’s University of Belfast. After her studies she worked at the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and the European Parliament before joining the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Insan Haklari Vakfi) in 2008. Since June 2010 she is also a council member of the Turkish Green Party (Yesiller Partisi).

On 12 September 2010, exactly 30 years after the last military coup in Turkey the Turkish people was asked to vote on a considerable change of the constitution that was adopted during military rule in 1982. These changes were presented by the Government as a major step towards democratisation and the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Government had surprised virtually everybody with these proposed changes and consequently the debates were heated, in Parliament and among the public in general. Was it a step by the Government to establish more power over the judiciary and thereby weaken an already weak democracy? Or was it a real step towards democratisation as those in favour of the changes argued?

In the referendum 58% of the voters supported the constitutional amendment but as there were widespread demands for an entirely new constitution the Prime Minister promised that the works for a new constitution would start soon.

In the meantime, some of the constitutional amendments were to be implemented quite soon after their adoption, thus allowing us to understand their impact on democratisation. In fact their implementation shows how close the promise of democratisation and the failure to fulfil this promise are linked. The election of a Court of Auditors member to the Constitutional Court by Parliament is a case in point.

The referendum changed the composition of the Constitutional Court. According to the Constitution of 1982 all  members of the Constitutional Court were chosen by the President. The constitutional change increased the number of members from 11 regular  and four supplementary members to 17 permanent members. Provisional articles to the new constitutional rules provided that the current four supplementary members would become regular members and that Parliament would elect the remaining two new members within a month. Considering that this was known in advance one would expect real interest from the public in this issue as the enhanced legislative powers were seen as a great step towards democratisation.

On 6 October 2010 the first member was elected among  three candidates nominated by the Court of Auditors (on 13 October 2010 another member was elected among three candidates nominated by the presidents of the bar associations). A real discussion of the candidates proposed by the Court of Auditors  does not seem to have taken place in the mainstream media. The reason for this might be the 1982 Constitution itself which expects bureaucracy to be apolitical.

Then, what do the parliamentary records tell us about the election? How did the rule that a qualified majority is necessary during the first round, and if not achieved an absolute majority during the second and again if not achieved, a simple majority during the final round function in practice?

The decision to hold the election on the candidate of the Court of Auditors was taken by the presidency of the Parliament a day before the election took place. Furthermore, the president of the Parliament acknowledged, that the Parliament had only received the names of the candidates, but no CVs or any other information. Unsurprisingly opposition MPs complained that  without any information on the candidates provided to them the election could not be a  democratic and transparent election. However, the president of the Parliament proceeded with the election. A discussion about the candidates did not take place. In fact, it appears from the parliamentary records that such a discussion was never foreseen.

As the candidates themselves seem to have been of no importance whatsoever to the parliamentary debate, we will omit their names and call them candidate A, B and C. During the first round the distribution of votes was as follows,

Candidate A – 259

Candidate B – 5

Candidate C – 3

Empty – 10

Void – 20

Total – 297

Now, we can say that a clear majority of those present knew – despite a lack of information on the candidates – for whom they ‘should’ vote. The result of the the second round was

Candidate A – 263

Candidate B – 1

Candidate C – 1

Empty – 16

Void – 40

Total – 321

We do not know how many MPs of each party participated in the election. However, what we can say is that for some reason about 20 additional MPs participated. Furthermore, again a clear majority knew for whom they were supposed to vote  and oddly candidates B and C received only one vote each. Finally, the necessary absolute majority of 276 votes was not reached. This posed a real problem for the third and final round. As the constitutional rules lie down that the two candidates with the most votes from the second round will make it into the third round, the Parliament was faced with the difficulty of two candidates having received an equal number of votes. After a break of 45 minutes, heated discussions and the MPs of an opposition party leaving the plenary, the second round was repeated. These were the results,

Candidate A – 190

Candidate B – 31

Candidate C – 8

Empty – 1

Total – 230

While the repeated second round certainly solved the actual problem, it leaves the observer  quite baffled. The repetition obviously served only one purpose, to find a second candidate for the third round in which a simple majority would be sufficient. The repeated second round was thus reduced to pure formality. According to newspaper reports, some MPs of the governing party decided to vote for candidates B and C (instead of candidate A which they actually preferred) to solve the problem. This is probably true. At least we can assume that the MPs of the governing party knew for whom they should vote and what the result of the election should be – they defended the  election process throughout the debates in Parliament.

The election came to an end with the third/fourth round. The results were as follows,

Candidate A – 256

Candidate B – 6

Empty – 2

Void – 1

Total – 265

Candidate A was thus elected with a simple majority by a Parliament which neither really bothered to participate in the election nor knew anything about the candidates it was voting for. Several conclusions can be drawn from this process. First, the election process was neither democratic nor transparent. A candidate had somehow been decided upon in advance and a majority of those present voted for this candidate.

Second, while the constitutional change certainly enhanced parliamentary powers, and is therefore to be welcomed, it is not unfair to say that the voting rules ruined it all. The need for consensus-building for a two-thirds majority in the first round was useless because an absolute majority could have been obtained in the second round by the governing party. However, the reduced threshold of a simple majority in the third round ensured that many MPs of the governing party did not even care to attend the vote. Thus, the crucial point is that a simple majority instead of two-thirds is asked for. In order to really enhance parliamentary powers and contribute to the democratisation process it would have been necessary to require a two-thirds majority.

Third, a democratic process was reduced to mere formality. However, what marks the democratic process and democratic legitimacy is not only the formal rule but also the content: the debate and the inclusive solution finding process. Here, the promise of an increased democratic legitimacy through the participation of the Parliament in the election of the country’s most senior judges exists on paper only. In reality, the implementation of this promise completely lacks democratic legitimacy as the election process was void of any substance.

Fourth, a majority of the MPs – by all accounts members of the ruling party – had no problems with this flawed and undemocratic election process. They defended the election process instead of defending their choice of candidate A. Yet, it is the governing party which presented this constitutional change, adopted it in Parliament and campaigned during the referendum for its adoption – and all the time promising ‘democratisation’. Consequently, it is not unfair to expect the MPs of the governing party to be at the forefront and defend the implementation of this promise of democratisation. But they did not.

Finally, the rifts in Turkish society, the deep mistrust against each other that all parts of society continue to nurture, display so well that Turkey is very much in need of ‘thicker’ democratisation. A glance at the parliamentary records shows that there was no real debate but only shouting one’s own truth at each other. At no point was there any attempt to talk to each other and to enforce that a parliamentary right is exercised in a democratic and transparent way. Yet, these rifts are what need to be overcome so that a political system where consensus-building is possible can be established. Only when the political actors decide to overcome their (publicly displayed) mutual dislike and contempt and work towards solutions which aim at including all parts of society, will they be able to tackle the country’s major human rights and democracy problems.-

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.=

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Dr. Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including Wall Street Journal, Middle East Quarterly, Middle Eastern Studies, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Newsweek. He also appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN-Turk, and al-Hurra.

The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of “Neo-Ottomanism

Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has cultivated close ties with Iran, Syria, Sudan, the Gulf Countries, as well as with Russia. In the West, the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy had until recently generally been interpreted as neo-Ottomanist, i.e., a benevolent attempt by Turkey to assert itself in the Ottoman realm, which was assumed to be to the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic community as well. However, a closer look reveals that Turkey is asserting itself exclusively in the Muslim Middle East, while ignoring other areas of the Ottoman realm. What is more, under the AKP, Turkish foreign policy empathizes increasingly not with the West, but with Russia and Iran, and especially with Arab Islamist causes.

Background

The AKP has pursued rapprochement with Sudan, Syria, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and has regular contacts with Hamas and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, ties with Turkey’s traditional allies have cooled. The AKP determinedly pursued European Union (EU) accession, but since membership talks actually began in 2005, the party’s energy for the EU has fizzled away. A public that is increasingly critical of the relationship with Israel checks Turkish ties with Israel. After seven years of AKP rule, Turkey maintains as close ties with Tehran, Damascus, and Moscow as it does with Washington, Tel Aviv and Brussels. This picture represents a departure from the traditional, exclusively pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. The question, then, is what drives Turkish foreign policy in the AKP age? The AKP’s foreign policy is not neo-Ottoman, in the sense that suggests secular imperial ambitions or status as a regional power. The AKP does not assert Turkey’s weight equally in the areas that were under Ottoman rule, namely the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. It should be noted that the late Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II (who ruled between 1876 and 1909) did seek to reassert the legitimacy of imperial rule on the basis of Islam. However, while Abdulhamid’s pan-Islamism focused on all Muslims, the AKP’s focus seems to be the Arab world. What is more, the AKP is asserting Turkish power in the Middle East with a slant towards Islamist Arab actors in the Middle East, and to a lesser extent towards Iran.

The party’s use of diplomacy is evocative: A study of high-level visits by AKP officials to the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus reveals that the party focuses asymmetrically on Islamist Arab countries and Iran, while it ignores Israel, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Between November 2002 and April 2009, the Turkish foreign minister made at least eight visits to Iran and Syria, while paying only one visit to Azerbaijan, a Turkic nation once considered to be the closest country to Turkey, and one to Georgia, despite the fact that after Georgia’s independence, Turkey had acted as a mentor for that nation. Similarly, between November 2002 and April 2009, the Turkish prime minister made at least seven visits to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, while paying only two to Greece and Bulgaria, Turkey’s two immediate European and Balkan neighbors.

The AKP has actively focused on Islamist and Arab Islamist affairs. It has shied away from criticizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, invited Hamas leaders to Ankara, maintained ties with Hezbollah, and built close commercial and political relations with Qatar. The AKP’s axis with these actors came under the limelight during and after the Gaza War. Instead of joining Washington’s moderate Arab allies, including Egypt and Jordan, who gathered on January 19 in Kuwait to discuss an end to the Gaza conflict, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s officials met three days earlier with leaders of Iran, Syria and Sudan in Qatar, effectively upstaging the moderates. Meanwhile, the AKP does not seem to care for the “Ottomanness” of the Caucasus. During the Georgia-Russia war, Turkey desisted from siding with Georgia, a former Ottoman-controlled country and close ally when it was invaded by Russia, the chief enemy of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the AKP managed to keep Russia satisfied, while punishing Georgian President Mikhail Saakasvhili for what Turkey’s ruling party views as his emphasis on Christianity in Georgian affairs.

Neither is the AKP’s foreign policy neo-Ottoman with regard to Iran. Turkish-Iranian relations have been marked by a stalemate since a peace treaty in the 17th century. The Turks had always been wary of Iran and of its nuclear ambitions, but in November 2008, Erdogan told a Washington crowd that “countries that oppose Iran’s nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons.” However, it should be noted that at least some in the AKP leadership still view Iran with suspicion due to its Shiite nature.

A Turkish foreign policy rooted in Ottoman grandeur would have required that the AKP to adopt an equidistance toward Jews and Muslims, and toward Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East. This has not been the case. Between 2002 and 2008, the Turkish foreign minister made five trips to Syria, while visiting Israel only once. During the Gaza War Erdogan suggested that Israel “had violated the ceasefire with Hamas” and claimed that “Hamas’ rockets are not causing any casualties in Israel.” Erdogan questioned the validity of Israel’s U.N. seat, while stating that he wants to represent Hamas on international platforms.

When Saudi King Abdullah visited Ankara in 2007, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul met the king at the Ankara airport and then visited him at night in his hotel room, in both cases violating diplomatic protocol. The Ottoman sultans would turn in their graves given the excessive attention being paid to the Saudi King, the protector and promoter of Islamist Wahhabi thought. When Wahhabism rose in Arabia in the nineteenth century, spearheaded by the Saud family, Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II sent troops to crush this fundamentalist “heresy” and defeat the Saudi house. After the Ottoman forces captured Abdullah, the great grandfather of today’s King Abdullah, they brought him to the Turkish capital where he was beheaded.

Implications

Rather than being neo-Ottoman in a “secular” sense, the AKP’s foreign policy is asymmetrically focused on Arab Islamists in particular and the Muslim Middle East more generally. It is pro-Hamas, pro-Syria, pro-Hezbollah, pro-Qatar, pro-Saudi. The AKP views the world as composed of religious blocks, and this disposition colors its views of the Middle East and the world. The subsequent anti-Western, anti-U.S., and anti-Israeli view has become a new paradigm promoted by pundits, think tanks, and newspapers close to the AKP. In a recent incident along this line, the AKP objected to the appointment of Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s secretary general on grounds that his behavior was “offensive to the Muslim world” during the 2006 cartoon crisis. This has caused many in the Euro-Atlantic community to conclude that instead of looking after the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community, Turkey is looking after the interests of the “Muslim world.”

A comparison of the AKP’s reactions to Gaza and Darfur reveals the party’s religion-based take on international affairs. At the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in Davos, Erdogan chided Israeli president Shimon Peres for “knowing well how to kill people.” On his return to Ankara, Erdogan hosted the vice-president of Sudan, many of whose citizens live in camps to avoid government persecution, creating the impression that the Turkish government is less sensitive to persecution carried out by Muslim regimes, and cares mainly when Muslims are targeted by non-Muslims.

Arab Islamist causes play a major role in shaping the AKP’s views of the Middle East. For decades, Turkey’s foreign policy makers were educated in Western or secular Turkish schools, spoke European languages, and looked to Europe for political inspiration and confirmation of Turkey’s Western identity. The AKP represents a rupture with that tradition. The party’s political leadership is composed of people educated in religious schools under a non-secular curriculum. Leaders hold degrees from universities in Arab and other Muslim countries. Most speak Arabic, and more importantly, the leadership looks at the Arab countries for inspiration and affirmation. This orientation drives the AKP’s political love affair with Arab Islamists.

Money also shapes the AKP’s foreign policy. Growing Qatari investments in Turkey, oil deals in Sudan and trade with Syria are material factors that underpin the Turkish-Arab rapprochement. Money also fuels Turkey’s relations with Russia. When the AKP came to power, Russia was Turkey’s eight-largest trading partner and the OECD had come to dominate two thirds of Turkish trade. In 2008, the combined U.S./European share of Turkish trade dropped to 50 percent for the first time, and Russia replaced Germany as Turkey’s top trading partner. Warm personal relations between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have buttressed the rapprochement, transforming Turkish-Russian relations — which have been marked by confrontation since the fifteenth century — beyond recognition. While this improvement of relations is a good thing, the problem is that the AKP has taken an uncritical view of Russian foreign policy. It is telling that although the Turkish government reacted harshly to Israel’s warfare in Gaza, it shied away from criticizing Russia when that country bombed Georgia.

Conclusions

The AKP’s foreign policy has a weakness for Arab Islamists and their causes. The policy shows empathy towards Middle East Muslims and Islamists, though the same empathy is missing towards non-Muslims and non-Middle Eastern issues. Business deals play an important role in sustaining the stronger ties that Turkey is developing with Russia, the Persian Gulf states, Sudan, and Iran. Therefore, Neo-Ottomanism appears to be a misnomer for the AKP’s foreign policy. Rather than secular Ottoman instincts, it is a religious view of the world and financial interest that seem to be shaping the AKP’s foreign policy. A better word to describe it would be “Econo-Islamist.”

The AKP’s Econo-Islamist foreign policy orientation has turned Turkey into a country which has as good, and sometimes even friendlier, relations with Iran, Russia, Syria, Sudan, Hamas, Hezbollah, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as it enjoys with the United States, the EU, and Israel. Ankara will likely opt out of a NATO consensus on Iran, clash with the United States on how to handle Hamas and Hezbollah, and disagree with the EU and the U.S. on Russia. A truly and comprehensively neo-Ottoman reorientation of Turkish foreign policy would, on the other hand, necessarily imply a welcome departure from the AKP’s current policies.

Originally published by Soner Cagaptay, The Turkey Analyst by The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute,  April 24, 2009.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright.

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