by Derya Ozkul (PhD candidate, School of Social&Political Sciences, University of Sydney)

Derya Ozkul is a PhD Candidate at the University of Sydney. Previously she contributed to the research conducted at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Committee on Migrant Workers and at the International Labour Organisation, MIGRANT Department in Geneva. Her work included research on migrant workers’ rights and violations of international human rights treaties in El Salvador, Colombia, Azerbaijan and Syria. She also worked as a researcher at the Migration Research Centre at Koc University (MiReKoc). She won the SS Best Written Essay from the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration at the European University Institute and the CCH Award for Best Written Paper from University of Sydney Law School. Some of her forthcoming publications include ‘Transnational Migration: A Theoretical Evaluation’ in Sirin, A. Re-thinking International Migration: New Approaches, Istanbul, Iletisim Yayınları and ‘Australia: a Classical Immigration Country in Transition’ (with Stephen Castles and Ellie Vasta) in Cornelius, W., Tsuda, T., Martin, P.L. and Hollifield, J.F. (eds.) Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Today in Berlin the Check Point Charlie Museum serves the new generations to observe and feel the social divisions of the past. The audience does not include only the German youth but many other tourists visiting the place around the world. To foreigners, the Check Point Charlie Museum seems to be attractive for that it reveals an imaginary divided city in a once-divided country. In this essay, I will discuss the creation of walls, the conditions behind their construction, and what walls really mean to us in our social spaces. I will explain my argument through the ideas of wall construction, inclusion, embodiment, violence and Julia Kristeva’s concepts of abject and abjection.

By its very nature any kind of walls constructed in a social space is not different than the borders between nation-states. A gated community in Berlin that defines its borders through bodyguards protecting their buildings seems to be similar to a nation-state that defines its sovereignty through the borders it builds around. However gated communities and nation-states are different than each other, on the very basis that the latter includes or excludes the citizenship rights. The once-built wall in Berlin defines not only its social space but also the rights for the residents in each side. These rights may include the right to access to information, as well as the right to move and travel.

Walls such as the Berlin wall define these rights through a process of embodiment among its citizens. Citizenship is designed in any nation-state through the relationship of body-and-right. Here the idea of constructing social spaces necessitates the process of governmentality as explained by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1975). Walls are not created in any place at any time. For their construction, some groups of persons need to be viewed as dangerous, and some groups need to be felt that they are insecure. For walls to be built, fears of being invaded need to be internalized by their surrounding residents. Here the national media holding the means of information-sharing plays a crucial role.

The ones who feel the need to be secured are usually rendered incapable of seeing their (economic, social and cultural) interdependence on the other side. However any object from the other side (the Western products for the Eastern Berliners, or the Eastern rules for the Western Berliners) is frightening.

This fear against the other side of the wall juxtaposed by the interdependency of both sides can be best explained by Julia Kristeva’s concepts of abject and abjection (1982, 1989). Kristeva explains the relationship between fear, violence and power through her psychoanalytic theories. She argues that a person needs to put the abject to the deepest point of consciousness in order to construct his/her own identity. In other words what is most feared and disgusted of, in fact, resides in the very construction of any person’s individuality.

Concerning the relationship between embodiment and citizenship, the same applies with including or excluding certain bodies outside of view and of experience. Walls complete the process of abjection. The abject that resides in the very depth of the subject can, in this way, be placed behind the wall. However the walls are not able to prevent the means of communication between the two sides. Walls are a form of violence and as violence itself is transformative, it self-creates new forms of it.

In the long run walls aim at obstructing the value systems of divided societies. The wall in Berlin produced distinct social spaces in each side. Here I shall note the importance of a documentary showing the insecure feelings of migrants in Berlin before the opening of the Berlin Wall. The documentary titled ‘Walls’ by Can Candan (2000) reveals the findings of in-depth interviews with migrants from Turkey and their constant fears against the Eastern Berliners. They claimed that the Eastern Berliners were not used to living with migrants and were therefore racists at best.

Furthermore in time both side views the other as more secret and dangerous. Here I need to note that I am using the adjective of dangerous not for the other side itself but for the fear of the possibility that the other side can do something. The danger stems from the unfamiliarity rather than a real known object. Therefore through the process of abjection the walls are claimed to establish a certain type of security.

Throughout the construction of (in)security, the walls also obstruct us to see the energy becoming in the other side. In this sense, the very violence that constructs the wall opens the way for other forms of violence. The wall of Berlin not only applied the violence of dividing families and close friends but it also produced new forms of it around the issues of trafficking between the two sides.

The transformative characteristics of the walls are not only for once. The new forms emerging produce other new forms. One can see that in the further securitization within the Eastern Berlin against trafficking to the West. This resembles a spiral-like relationship of violence between the two sides never ending, yet always self-reproducing itself. The vicious cycle constitutes four basic steps: construction of the wall, increasing unfamiliarity between the two sides, emerging forms of violence protesting against the walls, creation of even tighter security controls. In fact the both sides are interdependent on each other as tight as these spirals. The walls are constructed at the very instances where the two sides are to such an extent interdependent on each other. However in Berlin the end of the story emerges through its people, living in both sides.

The Check Point Charlie Museum today shows the meeting point of the two little men in traffic lights. What is used to organize the traffic in the city acquires new meanings. Today the two little men on these lights are the symbols of a once-divided city reminding its people that they could come together through their own will and ends. As a quote from Gandhi presents us the museum’s online website: “The world is so well built that against every injustice
there are stronger, vanquishing forces. …From every injustice arises justice, from every untruth truth, from darkness light.”

I shall conclude that the wall of Berlin was not a fixating form of violence but also a site of constant creativity. One could walk around Kreuzberg and look for the new graffitis on the wall. They were symbols of the newly emerging power of its people. Kreuzberg was then a district that was viewed as the end of the world, then populated by migrants from Turkey. Today that the wall is destroyed, Kreuzberg became the centre of the city, filled with the young Berliners, juxtaposing the Check Point Charlie Museum reminding us the past.                                                Berlin, 25 January 2012

Bibliography

Candan, Can (2000). Duvarlar/Mauern/Walls, 83 min.

Foucault, Michel (1975). Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard.

Kristeva, Julia (1989) Black Sun, New York: Columbia University Press.

Kristeva, Julia (1982) Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, New York: Columbia University Press.

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by Dr. Basak Alpan

Middle East Technical University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration & Centre for European Studies

It is not a prophecy to say that one of the most common concepts that those working on ‘Europe’ would encounter at various points in different capacities would be ‘Europeanisation’. This buzzword has also been crucial in understanding and explaining for Turkey’s European orientation path, which acquired a new dimension and has been carried to a more substantive and institutional level with the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join the EU. Especially after this date, the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ and the literature attached to it have almost automatically been employed to assess the relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration. Whilst the Europeanisation literature would typically be the first approach any researcher focusing on the 1999-2008 period in Turkey with a particular reference to ‘Europe’ and domestic debates would resort to, this paper argues that the hegemony of ‘Europe’ in this respect does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but from the power of discourses on ‘Europe’ in terms of their ability to contribute to the construction of antagonisms and demarcating political frontiers after 1999. In this respect, this paper aims to focus on the significance of the discourses and the notion of ‘hegemony’ in particular and the political in general to understand the process of Europeanisation with a particular focus on the Turkish political landscape. From a broader perspective, the current attempt here addresses the need by the Europeanisation literature to look at ‘Europe’ as a political and contested realm. If the Europeanisation literature aims to explain the European integration and ‘change’, it should go beyond explaining ‘change’ at the domestic level through ‘de-parliamentarisation, growing bureaucratisation and increase in policy-making‘ (Goetz et.al., 2008) and present a more political and reflexive account of ‘Europe’ in general. This is also in accordance with recent critiques posed against the literature by the Europeanisation scholars themselves such as Radaelli, Graziano and Vink. The need on the part of the literature to redefine ‘the European impact’ (Graziano and Vink, 2007) and to pay attention to broader political science questions such as power and legitimacy (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2009) shifts the literature‘s scope and shows that the literature and this thesis have a more interactive platform to share than the difference between the two in terms of scope and aim would point to.

For this aim, in this paper, I present a tri-fold picture of the European studies. According to this categorisation, the studies dealing with the notion of ‘Europe’ could be categorised into three groups: the studies which takes ‘Europe’ as a fixed concept (‘Europe-as-fixity’), those which subscribe to a notion of ‘Europe’ solely as a construct (‘Europe-as-construct’) and the studies which take ‘Europe’ as a contestation (‘Europe-as-contestation’). The claim here is that there is both a historical and epistemological need for the Europeanisation literature to go beyond taking ‘Europe’ for granted and solely as a construct and to address to the conflictual nature of the notion and Europeanisation should address Europe as a contestation (‘Europe-as-contestation’) and a hegemonic struggle.

After critically locating the Europeanisation literature within this categorisation, I argue that there is both a historical and epistemological need for the Europeanisation literature to address to the conflictual nature of the notion by focusing on how the discourses on ‘Europe’ hegemonised the Turkish political terrain after 1999 and I introduce  and identify the notion of ‘Europe-as-hegemony’. ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ is the name of the struggle itself for the hegemonic positions of political identities rather than a given concept with upper case, which would be the case in case of Europeanisation literature. Europeanisation literature poses an automatic and uncontroversial top-down relationship between the European level and domestic level and this relationship is inherently asymmetrical by definition. However, from the perspective of this project, we need to look at the relationship between ‘Europe’ and Turkish domestic politics from the lens of ‘hegemony’ and how the former shapes and hegemonises politics. This is an on-going, unfixed and contested process based on political struggle.

However, it is very difficult to deal with and operationalise the concept of ‘hegemony’, as has already been pointed out by many scholars talking about the concept in its Gramscian sense (Tünay, 1983; Morton, 2007) which is understood ‘as a contested, fragile and tenuous process, rather than simply a structure or edifice’ (Morton, 2007: 78).  What I understand by the term hegemony is the conviction on the part of political identities that a particular discourse is the lingua franca of politics so that each and every political identity has to talk that language in order to assert its location within politics. Therefore, discourses are essential to understand the notion of ‘hegemony’. However, it is important to underline at this point that in order to have a clear picture of ‘Europe’ as a contestation, the notion I will be using throughout the paper, ‘Europe-as-hegemony’, denotes an attempt, i.e. a hegemonic struggle, rather than the hegemony itself.

The overall argument is that the hegemony of ‘Europe’ does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but rather from the power of discourses on ‘Europe’ and their ability to hegemonise the political realm that are identified in the paper.

A shorter version of the paper submitted for the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference,  Boston, Massachusetts, 3-5 March 2011, Hyatt Regency, Boston, USA.

Please do not quote without permission from the author.

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Causes and Types of Euroscepticism by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) of Turkey

By Can Buyukbay

PhD Candidate at University of Zurich (Switzerland)

In this study, the Euroscepticism of the two Turkish political parties, CHP and MHP, are analysed and compared on the basis of party documents and speeches by party leaders from 2004 to 2007. The article addresses not only the types of Euroscepticism and the similarities and differences of the phenomenon, but also the causes of the different types observed by the political parties. Methodically, the content analysis of Mayring (2008), which enables a systematic, theory-based analysis of primary sources, and the difference method of John Stuart Mill (1874) are applied. Based on the four-fold typology of Kopecky and Mudde (2002), (where Euroscepticism is divided in Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Eurorejects and Europragmatists), a set of categories and their defining characteristics were created. Accordingly, an analysis of the party programmes and various documents were performed, which should serve to ascertain the types of Euroscepticism and to support a comparison of the two political parties.

The aim of this study is to analyse: “Which forms of Euroscepticism do the CHP and MHP show and what similarities and differences can be noted by these parties with respect to Euroscepticism? What are the causes of the differences and similarities in the attitudes of both parties?”

First, a distinction should be made between the conceptions of the MHP and the CHP towards European Integration. By analysing their respective conceptions it can be determined whether the parties can be classified as Europhile (Euroenthusiasts or Eurosceptics) or Europhobe (Europragmatists or Eurorejects) according to Kopecky’s classification. Kopecky describes Europhiles as believing in the key ideas of European Integration and Europhobes as opposing the general idea of European integration.

This study analyses their respective ideological dimensions as a distinguishing factor, for it can be assumed that in the relations between Turkey and the EU under the Copenhagen criteria, it is the political dimensions (namely, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, rule of law, protection of minority rights) rather than the economic dimensions that attract the greatest attention. Thus, this requires an analysis of the topics that are given high priority in the Turkish context (The Cyprus Case, human rights and minorities, the Armenian issue and Article 301). The investigation period between 2004-2007 is important because the progress report of 6 October 2004 and the negotiation framework of 3 October 2005 by the European Commission received much criticism from the political parties and has had a huge impact on Euroscepticism up to now.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) regards Turkey, in the party program, as an ally of the West (MHP: 2004). The possible EU membership of Turkey is recognized in the party program, but this integration should happen in a just and honourable way. However, it is apparent that there are reservations about Turkey’s national interests and sensitivities. It is not clear whether the Party’s program regards the national sensibilities and the national culture as being in conflict with the basic values of European integration or not. Ultimately, the interpretation of the subject areas by the party officials will expose the specifics of the MHP’s Euroscepticism. Although, in their party program, European integration and the EU are not explicitly rejected, sharp criticism by party officials about the fundamental ideas of European integration and the requirements of the EU can be found in the key subject areas. In regard to the MHP, uniform national identity is given the highest priority, furthermore, the transfer of sovereignty to EU institutions and the granting of freedoms relating to religion and expression are denied. Thus, the MHP, according to Kopecky and Mudde’s classification, fits in the Europhobe category. The MHP’s European discourse conflicts with the basic foundation of European values of democracy, respect for the individual, the protection of minorities and freedom of expression and religion. The MHP addresses the European discourse with a harsh negative rhetoric against the EU and its associated actors. The systematic “thought images” (Opp de Hipt 1987: 6) of the MHP with regards to European Integration and European Union seem to justify this categorization.

The party program of the CHP principally supports European integration and full EU membership (CHP 2008). In addition to this basic support, they stressed that the EU should evaluate Turkey with the same criteria as other candidate countries. A eurosceptical tendency is visible in the party program. On the one hand, European integration is explicitly supported, yet on the other hand, it is stressed that the current state of the EU does not reflect the fundamental values of European integration. To decide whether the CHP is EU-optimist or EU-pessimist, individual subject areas were analyzed. It may be noted that the CHP, according to Kopecky and Mudde’s typology, can be defined as Eurosceptic. A positive attitude towards European integration is expressed; however, a negative attitude towards the EU is still noticeable. In terms of European integration, there is no conflict between statements made by party officials and the party program. Euroscepticism identified in the CHP is primarily based on the belief that Turkey is treated unfairly by the EU.

 

 

On the basis of a qualitative analysis of the primary documents, the study arrived at the conclusion that the CHP can be classified as rather eurosceptic and the MHP as rather euroreject. Another important point, other than the forms of Euroscepticism, is the question of causality. Voters from both parties supported EU-membership during this time period by a majority. Second, concern about the European issue in the elections is quite low. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that these parties have a conditional or essential negative position towards the EU to maximize their votes. The strategic and tactical goals are basically indeterminate of the forms of Euroscepticism both parties express. Rather the ideological dimension is dominant. The CHP plays the role of the discontent democrat who feels betrayed by the EU, but also has to deal with the conflicts of Kemalism, whereas the MHP can be seen as a carrier of the extreme nationalist worldview.

References

 

CHP (2008): Party Program. http://www.chp.org.tr/Dosyalar.aspx?FileCatID=5 [14.04.2009]

Kopecky, P., Mudde, C. (2002): The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe, In: European Union Politics, 3 (3): 297-326.

Mill, John S. (1874). A System of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the Methods of scientific investigation. New York: Harper & Brothers.

 

Mayring, Philipp (2008): Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag.

MHP (2008): Party Program. http://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_parti_programi.php [11.07.2009]

Opp de Hipt, Manfred (1987): Denkbilder in der Politik. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

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THE EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKEY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by  Mustafa Sezer Ozcan (Doctoral student in Political Science at the University of Bielefeld)

Turkey has been a fundamental factor of European political, economic and cultural geography throughout the history. It has been trying to be a part of the European system since the foundation of the Republic. In fact, the Europeanization process of Turkey has longer and deeper historical roots that goes back to the Ottoman Era in order that the first essential steps were taken by the Ottomans on the way of Westernization. The Ottoman Empire, from the fifteenth century until 17th century’s Karlowitz Agreement was a significant world power who played an important role in the European balance of power system and had the ability to resolve the conflicts and lead the European states. In the early 17th century, as the Empire lost its military superiority and fell behind European states in technological developments, the Ottoman elite began to import European ideas, lifestyles, and ways of thinking from the Europe. During the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottomans showed a special eagerness for the adaptation of European culture, science and technology and tried to catch up with the European project of modernity in order to Europeanize the Empire. In the first place, they built military schools and academies which imitated the West; and, they prepared a constitution in 1876 (1) that was the first Constitution of the Empire, called “Kanun-i Esasi”, establishing a Constitutional Monarchy and through this constitution a parliamentary system had been established, which was an important development along the road to the supremacy of law. In addition to that the First Constitutional Monarchy was abolished later by Abdülhamit the Second and was reestablished again in 1908, by him (2).

On the other side, the first Ottoman Sultan who aimed to develop the relations with Europe was Selim the Third. The channels of communication between Europe and Ottomans were opened up during his time. He had associated much with foreigners, and was throughly persuaded to reform his state. Sultan Selim introduced the idea of joining the Western pact and changing methods of communication with other European allies. After concluding peace with Russia, he launched the programme of reforms which was named Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) aimed to give strength to the central state organization. Furthermore, Mahmud the Second, who came to the throne after Selim the Third, was responsible for more concrete actions such as the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 which marked the beginning of Europeanization (3). The reforms introduced by Sultan Mahmud had immediate effects on every aspect of life in the Empire including fashion, architecture, legislation, institutional organization and land reform. The period of Sultan Mahmud also witnessed more radical reforms especially with the Sened-i ittifak concerning the closest step toward constitutional harmonization. Therefore, Sultan Mahmud the Second is considered to be the first Sultan who put the Ottoman Empire on the European track, bringing it closer to the idea of Westernization (4).

Moreover, in 1856, the Islahat Imperial Edict was declared and with these two edicts, the non-Muslims who lived in the Ottoman Empire gained the same rights as the Muslims of the Empire. However, the reforms could not stop the dissolution of the Empire. With the demise of Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends, on that way, the Europeanization process was accelerated in the early 20th century. This was the time of building a new state that turns its face to the West. At first, the founders of the Republic decided to adapt the path of “Europeanization” for making the political transition from the theocratic Ottoman Empire to a secular nation-state. In this sense, Europeanization has been the guiding principle of the Turkish Republic which is also founded on the principles of peaceful foreign policy, secularism, the rule of law, a pluralistic and participatory democratic system, fundamental human rights and freedoms and this has meant a consolidation of democracy on the basis of European norms since 1950 (5). At this point, Atatürk sought to modernize Turkey by eliminating almost all aspects of the Ottoman system and adapt European practices, ranging from legal codes to alphabet to style of dress so that “the whole nation had turned its skin inside out.” (6).

Ultimately, Atatürk and his allies imposed their vision on the Republic of Turkey, which would be based upon secularism, Turkish nationalism and Europeanization (7). Following the Second World War, Turkey aimed to join the newly formed European institutions by ratifying political and economic agreements for having a place in the European system (8). In this respect, in 1963, Turkey signed the Association Agreement to be a member of the Western world. In December 1999, the Turkish candidacy status was announced by the EU in the Helsinki Summit and a new era in the EU- Turkey relations was openned. In the long run, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay in 2005. The decision taken at that Summit was in a way proof of the Turkish society’s European vocation and vindication of constant quest over the past centuries for modernity and progress. This process certainly gained an incomparable acceleration during the Republican era. Therefore, Helsinki marks a qualitatively new beginning and a process of mutual strategic transformation for Turkey and the EU (9). Since the EU membership perspective became far clearer from the standpoints of Turkey as a consequence of the European Council’s positive resolution in Helsinki, Turkey began to carry out further impressive reform process in the realm of some sensitive issues to eliminate the persistent shortcomings in Turkey’s political system (10). The Turkish government immediately passed the harmonization packages with the major constitutional amendments. These major reforms include the alteration in the anti-terror law which put restrictions on the freedom of thought and expression; freedom to establish private schools to teach Kurdish; and, broadcasting in Kurdish and other languages commonly used in Turkey through private television and radio stations: it removed the National Security Council’s executive powers and changed it into an advisory council. Finally, other reforms included an eradication of the state of emergency in the south-east, and the introduction of rights for non-muslim minorities. In consequence, the history of modern Turkey since the foundation in 1923 has been a history of Europeanization and democratisation. On that way, Turkey has become the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem world and has always attached great importance to developing its relations with other European countries. Turkey has shown that it is very keen to further its democracy and proved its commitment to the Europeanization process. But this process has only been possible because there is a strong connection between the Europeanization of Turkey and Turkey’s European vocation.

Endnotes

1 Ahmad Feroz, “Modern Türkiye’nin Olusumu”, 4. Edition, Kaynak Publishing, February 2005, p.40.

2 Metin Heper, “Türkiye Sözlügü: Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür”, Dogu Batı Publications, Ankara, 2006, p.27.

3 Speech of Can Paker at the Summer Programme of “ XVII NATO at 60 The Future of The Free World” held in Estoril Hotel-Lisbon, 25th – 27th June 2009. Available at:

http://www.ucp.pt/site/resources/documents/IEP/Curso%20de%20Ver%C3%A3o%202009/Papers/CanPaker.pdf

4 Ibid.

5 Kemal Kirisçi, “12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen Summit of the European Council and Turkey”, Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen Association Washington Office (15 December 2002), p.3. Available at:

http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/KIRISCICOPENHAGENTUSIADWDC.PDF

6 Paul Gentizon, quoted in Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in Jacob Landau, ed. Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p.26.

7 Paul Kubicek, “The European Union, European Identity, and Political Cleavages in Turkey”, Department of Political Science Oakland University p.4. Available at:

http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/kubicek_04D.pdf

8 Esra Cayhan, “Türkiye-Avrupa Birligi iliksileri”, Boyut Publications, Istanbul, 1997, p.24.

9 Pinar Tanlak, “Turkey EU relations in the post Helsinki phase and the EU harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly”, Sussex European Institute (SEI) Working Paper, August 2000, No 55, p.3.

10 Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union”, p.26.

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By Agnes I. Schneeberger, PhD student, Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds.

Grounded in empirical qualitative data from a cross-national comparison of Austrian and British focus group discussions, this study investigates the boundaries evoked by Turkey’s accession to the EU in citizen discourses and what they reveal about the status and definition of a European identity. While previous research has mainly focused on defining European identities through identification, this study employs the principle of différance. Drawing on identity theories this study suggests that a contrasting Other emerges as a main and general constituting feature in all identity formation processes. While the Eastern Other has played a major role in shaping European unity in the past, Turkey is seen to continue to embody a significant Other in the construction of European identities today.

“You know who you are, only by knowing who you are not” (Cohen 1994: 1). This quote by Robin Cohen pointedly summarises the rationale of this study. It refers to difference as a crucial element in the construction of meaning in general and identities in particular. Drawing on Saussure’s argument that language only consists of differences Derrida generalises that there is no meaning outside the system of différance (Derrida 2000). When looking at identities, difference is manifested in the polarity between the self and an opposing Other. In this sense, identities are constructed in a discursive relation to a significant Other (Hall 1996). Intuitively, one would argue that collective identities are formed through identification with a group that is based on a common origin. Following this line of thought, previous studies have focussed on the nature and degree of shared feelings of belonging to EU institutions, EU symbols or trust in fellow EU citizens to define the content and nature of European identity (Bruter 2005; Scheuer and Schmitt 2009). This study suggests that analysing manifestations of difference in citizen discourses offers another way to understand European identities. The rationale for this approach is that identification also requires difference. In other words, before identification with a group is possible, it requires some form of boundary that allows a group to differentiate itself from others. It is only through such a distinction, that a collective identity comes into existence. Analysing differences therefore offers a way to map the entity they are enclosing. Or to rephrase Cohen’s quote “you know who you are, only by knowing what makes you different from others”.

Turkey represents an interesting focus point for analysing European identity. The development of the Republic of Turkey from the remainders of the Ottoman Empire links the country to the image of the Eastern Other. In this sense, it is likely for Turkey to be a successor of the Ottoman Empire in its role as Europe’s opposing Eastern Other. Descriptions of Turkey as an “unusual” and “awkward” EU candidate country reflect these assumptions. It is argued that Turkey’s accession poses a unique context for analysing European identities as it simultaneously challenges the EU’s institutional, material and particularly its identitarian status quo (Arikan 2006; Arvanitopoulos 2009).

While a growing body of literature has explored media coverage of Turkey’s accession to the EU in different EU member states and Turkey, citizen views have largely remained unexplored. Since media tend to pronounce conflicts for reasons of increased news values a polarisation of the issue is a common outcome of most media studies. Complementing analyses of elite media discourses the following results offer a citizens point of view.

First results show that there is no essentialist or single European identity. European identity and Europe mean different things to different people, particularly in reference to gender and nationality. This supports arguments that understand European identity as a contested concept. It also illustrates the plurality of identities and their cultural and contextual embeddedness.

Discussants in both countries agree that religion and culture pose a major difference in terms of people’s ways of life and thinking that is being described as oriental or Middle Eastern. Further, people in both countries share the view that the military has too much influence and interferes with the democratic process in Turkey. Violations of human rights such as freedom of expression, minority rights and women’s rights are another line of differentiation that Austrian and British people share. The main cross-national differences are to be found along an economic and political-geographic divide. While British citizen highlight Turkey’s economic inferiority in terms of quality and health and safety standards as a difference, political and geographic differences feature more prominent among Austrian citizens. The majority of these differences are of a temporary nature and can be improved over time while only a minority such as religion and culture have the potential to pose a permanent difference. It is noticeable that Turkey’s is neither one nor the other in people’s perception.

Results have shown that women see Europe and a European identity strongly connected to a space that ensures human rights in general and women’s rights in particular. Women in both countries express concerns that the lack of human and women’s rights in Turkey poses a potential risk to their legal status as women in the EU. Women are also more concerned about the role of Islam as a major cause for the discrimination and suppression of women. These views stand in contrast to male participants who are more concerned about Europe in terms of political, economic and military aspects of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

In cross-national comparison British people see Turkish EU membership largely as an incentive for greater tolerance in the EU. They also admit Turkey greater cultural independence. People in Austria tend to be more concerned about Turkey’s ability to assimilate to existing cultural patterns. These differing perceptions reveal a different understanding of European integration: integration in terms of assimilation on the one hand and integration in terms of how one culture can contribute and transform another culture on the other. They also reveal that Austrians tend to see the EU as a normative power that changes whoever joins the group. British people see it more as an entity that changes with every new member.

British people are inclined to see Turkey’s accession as a way of increasing the power of the EU as a whole while Austrians are more concerned about how existing power structures will change if Turkey joins the EU. British people see any new member state as an extension of the power of the EU over their lives. This suggests that there are two significant Others for British citizens that define their European identity: the EU and Turkey. Both perceptions reveal a different kind of EU. While British people see it as a changing construct with extending power, Austrian people tend to see it as an entity whose power structures need to be preserved. In both cases Turkey’s accession leads to a feared loss of control but in different ways: from a British point of view it means the expansion of EU power and an Eastern enlargement beyond Turkey; from an Austrian point of view it means a loss of control over existing power structures in the EU.

Further, discussions have shown that the issue of Turkey’s accession to the EU prompts both Austrians and British participants to reflect more critically on their own religious tolerance and dominance. This suggests that discourses over Turkey’s accession encourage a more critical reflection of one’s own normative perceptions. Focus group participants in both countries expressed a general need for more knowledge, better education and information about Turkey and the EU. People in both countries see the potential for Turkey’s EU membership to benefit tolerance on both sides. Although Austrian people tend to expect a higher degree of assimilation, they express openness to change in exchange for more tolerance on the other side.

For people in both countries the East-West divide continues to be a framework of reference when describing Turkey as a Middle Eastern country. This does not mean, however, that people are happy with this terminology. Their descriptions point to the shortcomings of the East-West duality and its limited ability to describe today’s framework of Turkey and the EU. Descriptions of Turkey as being ambivalent are a consistent theme to be found in discussions in both countries. People refer to it as a bridge or something being wedged between Europe and Asia. Their descriptions of Turkey as a country with many contrasts could mean an attempt of surpassing the East-West terminology. This would lend support towards Rumford’s (2006) approach of discussing Turkey’s accession to the EU in the context of a postwestern framework.

Overall, results have confirmed that Turkey’s EU accession initiates a meta-discussion about what Europe means and where its borders lie. According to the differences expressed in the focus group discussions Europe is defined as a culturally familiar Western space, economically stable and legally protected entity. People’s difficulties to locate Turkey in the East-West duality points towards a certain miss-match between changed realities and normative views of Europe.

Please do not quote without author’s permission.

Bibliography

Arikan, H. (2006). Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? Aldershot, Ashgate.

Arvanitopoulos, C. (2009). Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy. Berlin, Springer.

Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Cohen, R. (1994). Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others. London, Longman.

Derrida, J. (2000). Différance. Identity: A Reader. P. du Gay, J. Evans and P. Redman. London, Sage: 87-93.

Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’? Questions of Cultural Identity. S. Hall and P. du Gay. London, Sage: 1-17.

Rumford, C. (2006). Rethinking Turkey’s relationship with the EU: postwestern Turkey meets postwestern Europe. Working Paper No. 3. Politics and International Relations Working Paper, Royal Holloway University of London.

Scheuer, A. and H. Schmitt (2009). “Dynamics in European Political Identity.” Journal of European Integration 31(5): 551 – 568.

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by Natalie Martin. PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University.

The decision by the EU to open accession talks with Turkey was one of its “most controversial ever” (Schimmelfennig 2008; 2009). Opposition to Turkish accession amongst public and elite opinion was high. So the obvious question to ask is why didn’t any member state veto proposals to offer Turkey accession status at the Brussels EU Council in December 2004?

Theoretically, in order to explain this research puzzle it is necessary to take a temporal, rather than a snapshot, approach (Pierson 2004). Using Historical Institutionalism (Steinmo 2008) it is to be argued that the options available to the member states in 2004 had been constrained by decisions taken previously. Specifically these can be traced back to the decision at the Helsinki summit to offer candidacy to Turkey.

The offer of candidacy – although arguably not sincere in intention – is a critical juncture in a path dependent process from 1999 to 2004. It encouraged constitutional reforms within Turkey which took Ankara closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The EU was then “rhetorically entrapped” (Schimmelfennig 2005) by its own conditionality.

However this is an empirically rich – rather than a theoretically parsimonious – account. As such, it must also assess the role of agency – as well as structure – and the impact of “security”, in a widened sense, on the policy decisions of the European Commission and the EU member states. It is to be argued that actors within the member states and the Commission were crucial in encouraging Turkey to carry out reforms. These actors were motivated by continuing geostrategic considerations and deliberately worked to counter the objections of Ankara’s opponents within a normative identity. Thus whilst it is theoretically irrelevant why 1999 was a critical juncture, empirically it is important to understand as the same security issues continue to be relevant and influential on EU policy up to 2004.

Methodologically I have sought to trace the process (George and Bennett 2005) from 1999 to 2004. This involves using primary sources and semi structured interviews. It does not claim to access “truth” but instead to make a case for a given hypothesis in a within-case analysis.

Looking first at Helsinki in 1999 my conclusions are that Turkey was offered candidacy as a broad result of changes wrought by the end of the Cold War. These changes influenced the policy decisions of the member states such that the offer of candidacy to Turkey was thought to be necessary. Specifically, the conflicts in the Balkans led to an up-grading of the eastern enlargement programme at the end of the 1990s and the development of ESDP. These both added impetus to long standing desires to find a solution to the Cyprus issue which required Turkey to be placated. The upgrading of eastern enlargement – and the subtle lowering of conditionality for Bulgaria and Romania – also weakened the EU’s normatively driven arguments against Turkey. ESDP’s need to have access to NATO’s military hardware further required Turkish sensibilities to be taken into account.

The Helsinki decision to offer candidacy was a major psychological boost for the Turks who were encouraged to carry out domestic constitutional reform. It also reinforced the institutional links between Ankara and the EU. However the security threads running through 1999 were still active. As Turkish reforms stalled amidst economic problems and weak government in 2002, the issues of a Cyprus settlement, eastern enlargement and ESDP came back to the fore in the run up to the EU summit at Copenhagen in December 2002. The AKP had been elected in November 2002 with a mandate for EU accession and its ministers had immediately embarked on a tour of European capitals to push for nothing less than accession status. The EU member states were not prepared to concede this point because of continuing human rights concerns. However their negotiating hand was constrained by the need for both a Cyprus settlement – in order to facilitate the final go ahead for Cyprus and the CEECs – and also a solution to the impasse over ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangements. The compromise was to offer Turkey a date for “talks about talks” at Brussels in 2004 dependent on further progress with domestic constitutional reform.

After Copenhagen there is evidence that the Ankara government was offered financial incentives and practical help from the European Commission to make progress with reforms in advance of the date for talks about talks. In effect it was encouraged to meet enough of the conditions in order for the recommendation for accession to be passed by the member states. This presumed that the member states would find it hard to veto Turkey’s accession if Ankara had done what was asked of it. Crucially this identifies a division within the EU between the Commission and some member states. DG Enlargement was in favour of Turkish accession. Gunther Verheugen believed it to be in the interests of the EU for strategic reasons. He was strongly backed by Romano Prodi and several member states including the UK and its “well-placed Brits” within the Commission. At the Brussels December 2004 EU summit, the objections of countries worried about human rights were countered. The only objection was from Austria and its Prime Minister Wolfgang Schussel was placated by the “sufficiently fulfilled” caveat in the December 2004 Presidency conclusions and a deal for Croatia’s EU ambitions. Thus Turkey was given the date for accession talks to begin.

The conclusion is that after the decision to offer candidacy to Turkey was taken at the Helsinki summit in 1999 the EU moved inexorably towards the opening of accession talks for two reasons. Firstly because Turkey moved closer than had been expected towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria and secondly because its geostrategic value could not be ignored. This combination “rhetorically entrapped” the EU member states within the system of liberal norms and values put forward by the EU.

However this is not merely a structural argument as I have made a case for the role of agency within the Commission and within some member states who prized Turkey’s geostrategic value highest. They sought to use the “rhetorical trap” instrumentally to achieve their goal of making Turkey an accession candidate.

References

George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) “Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.”  London, MIT Press.

Hay, C and Wincott, D, (1998) “Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism”. Political Studies, 46, pp. 951-957.

Hay, C.  (2002)  “Political Analysis: A critical introduction.”  Basingstoke, Palgrave

Schimmelfennig, F.,(2003). The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe :rules and rhetoric. 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schimmelfennig,F. (2009) “Entrapped again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey.” International Politics. 46:4, pp 413-431.

Steinmo S. (2008) “Historical Institutionalism” in Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences.” By Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Please do not cite or quote without permission from the author.

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by Dr. Alper Kaliber

The common denominator in most usages of the term Europeanization is its definition as a ‘process of change and adaptation which is understood to be a consequence of the development of the European Union’ (Ladrech, 2001, p.1). In the relevant literature the European Union (EU) is often presumed as the principal agent of change and only body politic where European norms, policies, and institutions are (re)constructed and exported to the domestic polities of the member and associate countries. For instance, in their top-down approach, Boerzel and Risse (2000, p. 6) understand Europeanization ‘as a process of change at the domestic level in which the member states adapt their processes, policies, and institutions to new practices, norms, rules, and procedures that emanate from the emergence of a European system of governance’. In this conceptualization domestic change through the EU is taken as a linear, empirically observable and testable process, the success of which mainly depends on the adaptational ability and learning capacity of the domestic societies. It is a teleological process of progress toward ‘the more European’ and ‘the more modern’ embodied in the core Western members of the EU.

In this peace I will argue that this evolutionary, and deterministic understanding of Europeanization is inadequate to comprehend transformations triggered by the European integration in the European social formations. In order to remedy the reductionism and essentialism of the literature, I attach considerable value to make an analytical distinction between EU-ization and Europeanization. In my distinction, EU-ization refers to a more concrete and restricted sphere of alignment with EU’s body of law and institutions. It is a formal process of adjustment the most radical impacts of which are manifest during the accession negotiations. Alignment with and implementation of the acquis communautaire is the sine qua non and the yardstick against which to measure achieved level of EU-ization.

On the other hand, Europeanization, rather than being a process, refers to a context or a situation (Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 26). the impacts of which are  contested, and variable reflecting specific conditions of different historical periods and of specific national contexts (Malmborg and Strath, 2002). The more the national and European-level political, bureaucratic and civil societal actors make reference to specific European norms, policies or institutions, the more Europe can be expected to have an impact on domestic policies, polities and political structures. In the same vein, the more the domestic public debates and identity claims react to specific European norms, values and policies, the more penetration of Europeanisation can be expected into domestic discourses. Thus, all utterances and actions by domestic and European level actors making reference to Europe and to the Europeanness in one way or another re-configure Europeanization as a context from which varying ideas, norms and values can be extracted and used at sub-national, national and supra-national politics.

Europe has extensively been implicated in modernization and nation-building processes in Turkey as a political and normative context long before the emergence of the EC/EU. This is not only due to the fact that Europe and Western modernity it has symbolized has been extensively mobilized by the modernizing elite to justify their vision of state and society since the 19^th century; but also due to fact that different political groups taking part in contemporary public debates about the nature of domestic regime and identity of Turkey have begun to articulate their political arguments by making reference to European norms, policies and expectations. Turkey entered the twenty first century under the shadow of ideological, political and economic debates flourishing in every segment of the society (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000). Two discourses of modernization and Europe have framed the parameters of these debates dominating Turkish politics and polarising the society. These are the Republicanist discourse defending a state-centric, secular and ethno-nationalist paradigm of modernization, and the integrationists foregrounding discourses of economic and political liberalization, and pluralism and civil society.[1] Whilst the Republicanist discourse is espoused by a coalition of military-led secular establishment, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and other nationalist groupings from left and right; the Integrationist paradigm is articulated by the liberal-oriented political and business elite, some Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals and the Islamists, mostly convened around the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), who call themselves as conservative democrats.

For Republicanists, Europe still represents the Europe of nation states and the birthplace of modernization as a universal project of enlightenment. Secularism and nationalism have been the two indispensable pillars of Western modernity and culture with which Turkey should be engaged. Turkey can be part of this Europe only if it can safeguard the Republican values (i.e. secularism, rule of law, Kemalist nationalism) enshrined in the constitution, and even against the West, if necessary. For the Integrationists, Europe is rather the Europe of liberal democracy associated with pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, market economy and economic welfare. European integration as a civilizational project is also a means for Turkey to be a regional and global actor, to integrate with globalizing world politics and economy. In particular, the Islamist wing of the Integrationists does not forge a necessary linkage between modernity and the West (Rumford, 2006, p. 5). To them, a Turkey that reconciliates the Eastern and Western elements of its identity can achieve an alternative model of modernity (Davutoğlu, 2004).

In essence, different discourses of Europe and Europeanness have been an integral part of modernity debates in Turkey, which are also shaping the domestic and foreign policy agenda of the proponents of this debate. The Republicanists and Integrationists are converging on the idea that values, institutions, policies described as modern and associated with democracy are largely embedded in the European model of society—mostly West European—to which Turkey should be a part. However, they are diverging in both the definition of these values and institutions and the ways in which Turkey should appropriate them (i. e. the speed, content, timing and extent of the appropriation). The debates about Turkey’s place in world politics and its identity are not at any conditions grounded on the rejection of modernity and Europe, but rather on their different interpretations. Europeanization impacts upon Turkish society as a political-normative context where the norms, values, institutions assumed as European are increasingly shaping the varying discourses of modernization in the country.

References

• Boerzel Tanja A., Risse, Thomas, (2000), ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4:15; available at
  http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm
  .

• Buller, Jim and Gamble, Andrew, (2002), ‘Conceptualising Europeanization’, Public Policy and Administration, 17(2):4-24.
• Davutoğlu, A . (2004), ‘Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı’ [Turkey Should Become a Pivotal State], Radikal (Turkish Daily), 26 February.
• Malmbordg, Mikael, Af and Strath, Bo. (2002) ‘The Meaning of Europe’, (Berg Publisher).
• Rumford, Chris, (2006), ‘Rethinking Turkey’s Relationship with the EU: Postwestern Turkey Meets Postwestern Europe’, Politics and International relations, Working Paper No 3, Royal Holloway University of London.

• Kasaba, Reşat and Bozdoğan, Sibel, (2000), ‘Turkey at a Crossroad’, Journal of International Affairs, 54(1): 1-20.
• Ladrech, Robert, (2001), ‘Europeanization and Political Parties Towards A Framework for Analysis’, Keele Political Parties Research Unit (KEPRU), Working Paper 7, available at www.keele.ac.uk/depts/spire/research/KEPRU/Working_Papers/KEPRU%20Paper%207.pdf .

Please do not cite or quote without permission from the author.

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[1] However, one should note that the proponents of these two visions of modernity are far from being homogenous and consists of clusters with diverging views, backgrounds and fault lines. Yet a specific perception of modernity and Europe is shared among its members.

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by Paula Sandrin, PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster

In this article, I explain changes in Turkey’s foreign policy using the concept of security culture as analytical framework. I argue that there is a clash of security cultures within Turkey, between what I call “traditional” and “emerging” security cultures. These competing security cultures have very different features and will be manifested in very different foreign policy practices.

The concept of security culture is a spin-off of the term strategic culture, first formulated by Jack Snyder (1977). Strategic culture, as defined by several authors (see for example, Booth 1990, Klein 1991, Posen 1996, Berger 1996, Johnston 1996 and Lantis 2005), concerns issues around how members of a given society view national security and preferences regarding the use of force in international relations. These definitions, however, do not address broader issues of a state’s orientation towards how best to achieve its security. Paralleling the calls in security studies for the broadening and deepening the concept of security, Krause (1999) suggested the introduction of the concept of security culture, which builds upon the work on strategic culture but moves it away from its emphasis on military affairs and the use of force. Therefore security culture refers to all the means available to achieve security, including, but not restricted to, the use of force.

I propose a simplified, yet useful and comprehensive, definition of security culture, as comprising assumptions on what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them. As a first step, it is necessary to investigate the formation of a country’s national identity. As a second step, it is necessary to examine the effects of security cultures on actual policies, since insecurities as discursive articulations are materialized in concrete practices. By analyzing the behavior of a country in external affairs, it is possible to identify the empirical referents of a security culture.

During the Cold War, Turkey’s traditional security culture, rooted in the Turkish identity seen as Western, homogenous and secular, and characterized by geographical determinism, the Sevres Syndrome, and various types of fear (encirclement, loss of territory, abandonment) was translated into a Western foreign policy orientation, aiming at being fully integrated with Western institutions. Contrastingly, Turkey adopted a cautious and non-interventionist approach towards neighboring countries, especially the Muslim Middle East. When Turkey abandoned its non-interference policy, as was the case of the Baghdad Pact, it did so in alignment with Western policies.

In the 1980s, this traditional Turkish security culture began to be questioned. New identities began to resurface, and different security discourses began to appear. Under Turgut Ozal’s premiership in the 1980s, a series of political and economic liberalizing reforms were conducted, resulting in the emergence of a Turkish civil society and empowered Islamic groups, which in time would begin to question Turkey’s security conceptions and foreign policy practices.

Turgut Ozal himself had a different idea of Turkey’s identity and how it should behave. In his view, Turkey could be a bridge between East and West, and Islam, Turkish nationalism and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire were all sources of soft power for Turkey. Ozal saw more opportunities than threats emanating from its neighborhood, especially economic opportunities. The Middle East in particular was seen as a promising market for the developing Turkish industry, and Ozal did not refrain from emphasizing a shared Islamic identity between Turkey and the region (Altunisik 2009).

Ismail Cem, foreign minister from 1997 to 2002, was another political actor which seemed to be informed by a different security culture. Following the steps of Turgut Ozal, Cem formulated an alternative perspective for the conduction of Turkish foreign policy. He emphasized Turkey’s multicivilizational character and the need to engage with the neighborhood more constructively (Altunisik 2009).

The decision of the European Union to accept Turkey as a candidate country in 1999 represented an important step in the consolidation of Turkey’s emerging security culture. The EU has been used by Turkish political actors as a “vincolo esterno” (an ‘external tie’ – The term was coined by Dyson and Featherstone 1999) which empowers certain domestic actors at the expense of others, and provides justification and legitimacy to certain policy courses which otherwise would be considered unacceptable. EU-related reforms weakened the military, empowered political and societal actors, businesses and civil society organizations, which seem to espouse a different security culture, and legitimized their policy choices.

One important political actor which seems to be informed by a different conception of Turkey’s identity and a different security understanding is the AKP. Following Turgut Ozal and Ismail Cem, the AKP also stresses Turkey’s multicivilizational character and its ability to be active in many regions: “Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy” (Davutoglu 2010). Turkey should no longer be a frontier country, as it was during the Cold war, or a bridge between civilizations, as it was perceived in the 1990s. Now Turkey should be a central country providing security and stability in its areas of influence, where it has historical responsibilities, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Gulf and the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Seas (Davutoglu 2008).

It is interesting to observe that the Ahmet Davutoglu’s doctrine of Strategic Depth is very much infused with ideas of geopolitics, just as traditional recipes for Turkey’s behavior in external affairs have always been. Notwithstanding, Professor Davutoglu’s reading of Turkey’s geography is significantly different from the reading of traditional actors, and therefore his policy prescriptions also differ. Davutoglu promotes a drastic change in the narrative of Turkey’s foreign relations. Instead of a borderline paranoid assessment that Turkey is encircled by unfriendly countries all involved in “playing games over Turkey”, Davutoglu establishes “areas of influence” in which Turkey should increase its role as a facilitator, promoting diplomatic relations and setting channels for political dialogue. Turkey is no longer the “victim” of its neighbours or its neighbours “victims” of Turkey’s aggression in self-defence. Now Turkey should be a benign leader in its bordering regions, prioritizing dialogue as a means of solving crisis. The main features of Turkey’s traditional security culture, i.e., the Sèvres Syndrome, geographical determinism, fear of encirclement, territorial disintegration, and abandonment, give way to concepts of “sphere of influence”, “zero-problem policy” and desecuritization.

In short, instead of seeing the regions around it as a source of risks, Turkey began to see them as areas where it could play a proactive role in the maintenance of peace and stability. This change is due to Turkey’s different perception of itself: no longer the lone civilized country in an uncivilized neighborhood, but a country with historical affinities with its neighbors. This distinct identity construction led to a change in the perception of “the others”, and consequently changes assumptions on what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them.

References:

Altunisik, Meliha (2009). “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”. In: New Perspectives on Turkey 40.

Berger, Thomas U. (1996). “Norms, Identity and National Security on Germany and Japan”. In: Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed) (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Booth, Ken (1990).  “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed”. In Jacobsen, Carl (ed.). Strategic Power: USA/USSR. New York: St. Martin’s.

Davutoglu, Ahmet (2008). “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”. In Insight Turkey 10 (01)

Davutoglu, Ahmet (2010). “New World Geopolitics – How Turkey is contributing to global peace and security as a member of the UN Security Council”. Lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – 29/01/10.

Dyson, K. and Featherstone K. (1999). The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford University Press.

Johnston, Alastair Iain (1996). “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China”. In: Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed) (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Klein, Yitzhak (1991). “A Theory of Strategic Culture”. Comparative Strategy 10 (2).

Krause, Keith (1999). “Cross-Cultural Dimension of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview”. In Krause, Keith (ed.). Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building. London: Frank Class.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. (2005). “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism”. In:  Strategic Insights IV (10).

Posen, Stephen Peter (1996). Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Jack (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica: RAND.

Please do not cite or quote without permission from the author.

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