Changing Turkey in a Changing World

by Francesco F. Milan, PhD candidate and teaching assistant at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, researching Turkish civil-military relations and security issues. He also works as a consultant and freelance analyst on security matters, and his articles are available at www.ffmilan.net.

Clearly, the protests that are shaking Turkey have very little to do with Gezi Park’s trees. What hit Istanbul first, followed by many other Turkish cities, is the backwash of institutional problems that have been lingering for decades; problems that the AKP, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party, has so far benefitted from, and has in part exacerbated.

When, in April 2007, Erdogan decided to have Abdullah Gul (one of AKP’s most important representatives) running for President, secularist circles erupted against what they perceived as a threat to one of the institutional strongholds of Turkey’s secular identity. In their view, AKP’s unilateral decision to present Gul as candidate for the position once held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was too radical a break from the tradition that saw the presidential post reserved to generals or, more recently, to political figures of Kemalist inspiration. The Turkish General Staff published a declaration on their website, reiterating the armed forces’ loyalty to the principles of Kemalism, and stressing that they were ready to intervene should such principles be violated – a critique to both AKP’s political positions, and to their attempted concentration of powers into AKP’s hands, as the party also had a solid parliamentary majority.

Shortly after the statement was published, millions of Turks hit the streets to stage a peaceful protest against Gul’s candidacy, many of them chanting “neither sharia, nor coup” – an attempt to express how they were against the potential intrusion of religion into politics, but also asking for the military, who staged four coups (with the most recent one in 1997) and are traditionally considered the guardians of secularism, to stay out of the issue. Regardless of how numerically impressive the rallies proved to be, Turkish society’s ‘silent half’ only emerged during the general elections held in July 2007, when Erdogan won with a 46% majority. The two main opposition parties, the secularist CHP and the nationalist MHP, only obtained a 20% and 14% share of votes. Subsequently, AKP MPs single-handedly elected Gul President, despite CHP’s and MHP’s opposition.

What we see on Turkish streets today has some commonalities with what happened in 2007; however, over the last few years some fundamental changes have also took place. Erdogan has been elected for the third time in 2011, with 49% of votes. CHP has attempted to reshape itself, replacing its traditionalist leader Deniz Baykal with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who, on paper, was supposed to bring new ideas and new energies into the party. But a real change was never achieved, and after an underwhelming electoral result in 2011 (25%), CHP has progressively backpedalled towards more traditionalist and Kemalism-centric positions.

In the meantime, military circles were shook by the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, which focus on an alleged clandestine network that, according to prosecutors, has been operating since AKP’s first victory in 2002 in order to facilitate and eventually stage a military coup. The imprisonment of hundreds of military officers had the consequence of delegitimizing, at least temporarily, the military’s footprint in Turkey’s domestic politics, curbing their influence. Over the last years, those more critic towards the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases have defended the hypothesis that the trials would in fact be a mere purge against the armed forces, AKP’s arch-enemy, as well as against the most staunch voices from the opposition, as dozens of journalists jailed due to charges based on opinions expressed on the Turkish media.

The political crisis of 2007 already reduced the military’s political expectations, as they had to take a step back when faced by the overwhelming majority Erdogan obtained through the ballot box; moreover, generals were also aware that none of the alternatives to an AKP government would have guaranteed Turkey’s political stability. Regardless of the extent to which the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases are legitimate, the detentions that were carried out over the last years (about 400 military officers are currently behind bars) played a significant role in isolating the most radical members of the armed forces, and in reducing the general’s influence.

After having consolidated his political power, reduced the military’s political influence, and kept criticism at bay, Erdogan achieved ideal conditions to push AKP’s political agenda ahead without any problem. The protests of Gezi Park want to address this convergence of powers towards Erdogan, his idea of a democracy that should express itself only through elections, and his increasingly confrontational attitude and refusal to accept dialogue. The few activists that first occupied Gezi Park a few days ago were dealt with by the police through a disproportionate use of force, in what became the brutal crackdown of a peaceful protest. That event turned into the boiling point for a large share of Turkey’s society, who, over the last months, felt like Erdogan was running a one-man show. The fact that the Turkish media purposely ignored the protests (turning CNNTurk’s penguins into a powerful symbol) did nothing but further radicalising the protest, exposing even more how the Turkish system is suffering from a concentration of powers and from the lack of a functioning system of formal and informal checks and balances.

Among those protesting, a small minority has been calling for the military to intervene; however, their expectations clash against the lack of political and social conditions that triggered military interventions in the past. On the contrary, the protester’s vast majority claims decisional autonomy on a range of social issues on which Erdogan demands sole authority – just what military juntas did in the past. Erdogan’s rough style has simply triggered protests that have been lingering for quite some time among AKP opponents – and those who expected a more moderate AKP alike.

However, Erdogan’s electoral weight should not be overlooked. Since 2002, general elections systematically turned into quasi-plebiscites for his party, while the CHP has regularly lagged behind, and the 10% threshold kept smaller parties from emerging. From the position of strength he gained over the last ten years, and being well aware of Turkey’s political dynamics, Erdogan showed a defiant stance towards the ongoing protests. He also accused the international media, social networks, and foreign secret services of (respectively) having provided biased and false information, and of having fuelled protests to destabilise his government.

We can see two different ideals of democracy clashing in Turkey today. On one side, the ideal held by that part of society who protests against a model that, recent democratic achievements notwithstanding, still maintains the rigid and centralised structure that the Constitution (written by the military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup) embeds. On the other there is Erdogan, his political project, and the ‘silent’ part of society that supports him.

The original version of this analysis can be found (in Italian) on Aspenia Online, Mideast Flashpoint

By Dr. Ozan Örmeci (Girne American University, Cyprus) 

A small environmentalist protest that started on 28 May 2013 in order to protect one of the rare green areas in Taksim called “Gezi Park” surprisingly turned into a massive social movement in Turkey this week. Although the Turkish media -probably because of government’s pressures- did not seem willingly to publish news about the anti-government demonstrations in the early days, after a huge interest shown by the international media, demonstrations became very popular in the country and spread to all “metropolis” cities in Turkey including İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Nowadays, there are discussions in Turkish and international media about whether these peaceful and democratic demonstrations could turn into a “Turkish Spring” similar to Arab Spring movements. In this article, I would like to take a closer look to “Occupy Gezi” movement and analyze the reasons that gave birth to this event.

When we take a closer look to events taking place in Turkey, it is not surprising to see that the driving force behind this social movement is the fear of secular-minded Turkish people towards the increasing Islamist, authoritarian and one-man based political practices of the ruling JDP (Justice and Development Party) government. Just two weeks ago, the government by using its majority in Turkish Grand National Assembly, passed a controversial law limiting the sale and the use of alcohol in the country. This was followed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements defending this law with making reference to Islamic holy book Qur’an, a clear violation of secularism principle of the Turkish constitution. Maybe for the first time in Turkish political history, a politician defended his political positioning solely by religious reference, an unusual practice for secular Turks. In addition, Erdoğan blamed founders of secular Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü as “two drunkards”, which created enormous anger among Westernized segments of the country towards the pro-Islamic Prime Minister. These events were perceived as government’s interference into private sphere and direct intervention to people’s lives.

Second important reason behind massive social movement was the excessive use of force by Turkish policemen, a historical national habit for Turkish armed bureaucracy. Although in the early days, participation into demonstrations were very limited and ecology-based in its essence, harsh methods used by Turkish police towards peaceful demonstrations created anger among Turkish people especially among Turkish youth and transformed “Occupy Gezi” into a social revolutionary movement.

Thirdly, it is no coincidence to see that environmentalism and ecological issues are still seen very marginal and unimportant issues by the JDP government and generally by all Turkish political parties and politicians. However, Westernized and better-educated segments of the country have started to show increasing interest into environmentalist issues in the last years. Thus, Gezi Park is perceived as a last castle in Taksim Square and the government’s intention to destroy the park triggered environmentalist sensitivities.

Fourthly, events were organized by young Turkish citizens using social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter, a modern youth having knowledge and conscience about Western standards of democracy and Turkey’s lack of having it. Technological revolution of the last decade became a convenient tool for suppressed groups to defend their views for radical democracy, as it was seen in the case of Jasmine and Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2012. The use of social media turned demonstrations into a protest youth organization reminding the 1968 generation and Woodstock festivals of the past. However, after Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement describing Twitter as a “headache for countries”, yesterday Turkish police started to arrest students who use social media to organize these events.

Fifthly, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s arrogant response to protesters by saying “We took a decision and no matter what you do, we will remove this park from there” as well as “These are marginalized bandit groups” made the demonstrations even stronger. As Erdoğan spoke, the number of people who joined the demonstrations increased. Erdoğan, starting from the early days of his career, has always preferred a daily life language in his speeches in order to seem like a “leader coming out of people from the streets”, but his rude style of speech continues to irritate better educated people in the country. This time, the hatred towards Erdoğan’s Islamic populist style seems to reach the highest point among secular segments of the country.

These reasons led to a popular social movement and crowded demonstrations that gathered people from different identities (environmentalists, anti-capitalist leftist and Islamic groups, liberals, gay and lesbians, Kemalists, Kurds) together. Although this heterogeneous group does not possess a strict common ideology, one thing makes them unified; being against Erdoğan’s authoritarian and Islamist one-man rule. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan, instead of decreasing the tension, chose to insult young people and this social movement and proved once again that he is not a man of negotiations but of dictating. The demands of the protesters could be stated as the protection of Gezi Park, government’s respect and guarantee for different lifestyles, stopping of police brutality and resignation of Prime Minister Erdoğan. In fact, first three demands could be easily realized but Erdoğan probably won’t make such a thing because of his jihadist worldview that considers democratic negotiations and agreements as defeats.

As a close observer of Erdoğan, I can say that although these demonstrations were promising for the future, the weakness of Turkey’s pro-secular political parties -namely social democratic Republican People’s Party and Turkish nationalist Nationalist Action Party- will probably make Erdoğan even more angry and authoritarian in the following days. Erdoğan clearly believes in Rousseau type of majoritarian democracy and he does not see any problem about Islamic and authoritarian transformation of the country as long as he wins in the elections. After the elimination of pro-secular Turkish Armed Forces in the recent years, Erdoğan will continue to use his majority in the Parliament to make the regime more Islamic and will leave little space for pluralism. No matter how hard he tries to cover it, Erdoğan is a radical Islamist who wants to establish an Islamic political system and he won’t stop until he is out of the scene. Erdoğan takes his power from uneducated masses and he is like a rock star for pious Turkish and Kurdish people. He has managed to survive until now, although his foreign policy with the aspirations of creating a new Ottoman Empire became troubled vis-a-vis Syrian crisis. Thus, dethroning “Sultan Erdoğan” does not seem easy for the opposition groups at least for the moment. In addition, Erdoğan is the mastermind of polarized politics and until now he has won 3 general (2002, 2007, 2011) and 2 local elections (2004, 2009), as well as 2 referendums by polarizing the society within the lines of secularist-Islamist dichotomy. That is why, these events may not weaken but consolidate Erdoğan’s regime.

The only barrier for Erdoğan could be the negative economic performance of the country in the near future, which could raise questions about the success of his regime. Establishment of a new liberal political party that could unify all these opposing groups and new social actors in the country could also be a chance for the deepening and more pessimistically for the survival of Turkish democracy. Finally, in my opinion what has been happening in Turkey is different from Arab Spring movements since Turkey has a flawed -but still- democracy. However, at the same time I also think that there is no mistake in calling this process as “Turkish Spring” since this is a new sociopolitical process driven by the politicization of Western lifestyles of modern Turkish youth with the use of new technological tools, which could help Turkey to deepen its democracy and get rid of Islamic authoritarianism in the future.

Dr. Gözde Yılmaz

On May 27, 2013 the protests in Taksim Gezi Park were launched by environmentalists in order to preserve the park from the Turkish authorities, who want to reconstruct the previously demolished Ottoman military barracks that would also include a shopping mall inside the building. Protests started with a cry to preserve the limited green area left in Istanbul and turned into a democratic protest series all over Turkey. Increasing police violence against peaceful demonstrators, which was kept secret from the public by censorship of the mainstream media and reached to a number of people through non-mainstream and new social media, touched hearts of many and drove them to the streets.  Demonstrations spread all over Turkey and attracted increasing support day to day from different segments of society. Students, artists, academicians, public workers, and many from different profession, social class and with different political orientation cried the main slogan of the protest “Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance”. The slogan demonstrates the reason of the spill over of protests in all over Turkey. People felt compelled to resist ‘something’. People were fed up with ‘something’. ‘Something’ united people with different backgrounds and political ideology. Although ‘something’ changes from person to person in the protests (e.g., alcohol ban, education reform, environmental problems, censorship), I would say, all united on one matter: democracy. The protesters were united against the repressive tendencies demonstrated by the AKP government and for the desire for democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms. As the Minister of Education and Justice and Development Party (AKP) Member of Parliament, Nabi Avci, states, “These events demonstrated how we are successful and capable as the government. We achieved something, the opposition could not have achieved however they try, in five days. We caused the union of different segments of society that can not be imagined to unite in all circumstances.” Interestingly, the people of Turkey seem to adopt the official motto of the European Union in the domestic arena despite the train crash in the EU accession process: “unity in diversity”. People of Turkey united against “something!” and chanted “resistance for democracy, resistance for freedoms!”

By Ayşe Ezgi Gürcan (Political Science, PhD, Istanbul – Turkey)

In the 8^th day of the occupation, the Park has already turned into a small campsite with its make-shift infirmaries, pharmacies, library, kitchens and information center. Although the international media label the protestors as ‘seculars’ and the government officials continue to call them as fringe groups, the “residents” of Gezi Park in Taksim square include people with different socio-economic, religious and ethnic backgrounds, i.e. leftists and anti-capitalist pious Muslims, Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, Gender minorities, artists and students. It is also important to note here that there are also those who voted for the incumbent Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the elections among the activists. As a result, calling the Gezi events as a clash between those against JDP and the government is misguiding.

The Park turned into a symbol for the problems in the quality of democracy in Turkey. The narrow understanding of democracy that put excessive importance to electoral politics, the opposition parties’ inability to communicate the needs and demands of their constituency, the increasing perception of compromises, accommodations, and negotiations to create legitimate policies in a parliamentary system as weaknesses, along with the de facto censorship of the press and the excessive use of force by the police pave the way for the increase in unconventional forms of citizen action in Turkey. The yearn for deliberative democracy, the fear of losing basic rights and liberties, and the increasing environmental concerns due to the urban renovation and Hydroelectric dam projects are factors that drive the protestors to demonstrate all over Turkey.

Even though the specifics of the demands vary, all actors involved so far stress on the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech and expression. But what the people in Gezi Park want first is to prevent the destruction of the park. It does not make a difference whether or not they intent to build a hotel, a shopping mall or a museum. The residents and the activists want to keep all the trees and the park intact, and want to be a part of the decision-making processes. Additionally, the protestors in Turkey in general want transparency in decision-making processes and exercise their fundamental rights and liberties. They also want a free press that can provide unbiased and continuous information flow, rather than showing documentaries, soap operas, beauty pageants or pro-government programs. Whether or not the JDP in general and PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular will listen and negotiate with the demonstrators – at least with those in Gezi Park – is another matter. One thing is certain in the short-run the occupation of Gezi Park will continue.

Dr. Mark Meirowitz (SUNY Maritime College, New York, USA)

1. The reaction of the Turkish Diaspora is very significant. The Turkish Diaspora has been key to Turkey’s ability to pursue its interests around the world, especially in the US. Now the Turkish Diaspora appears to have actively mobilized in public demonstrations around the world against the Turkish government – which may diminish the fervor and enthusiasm of the Turkish Diaspora to support Turkey’s interests in the future (such as in connection with legislative matters in the US Congress of concern to Turkey). Time will tell whether this will be the case.

2. What is impressive is the outpouring of political expression in Turkey. The political opposition (especially the opposition political parties) has been weak and not united. The Gezi protests may presage the development of a wide movement, across the political spectrum, in opposition to the government. The question is whether this will (or can) be translated into success at the ballot box.

3. Lastly, the emergence of President Gul as a moderating voice and influence is also an extremely important aspect of these events. His influence on Turkish politics may be increased as a result of his actions surrounding these events.

By Dr. Gülçin Erdi Lelandais (Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique [CNRS], FRANCE)

As you may know, for more than a decade, many renewal projects have been realized in Istanbul and several of them have been conceived in a non democratic way with top-down decisions resulting on forced displacement of many inhabitants. There are several organizations which struggled against these projects and called for mobilization against the destruction of trees in Gezi Park on 27^th May. However, the violent police treatment of these peaceful protesters provoked a deep indignation in Turkish society and a huge number of people decided to support and to meet for Gezi Resistance. Activists in Gezi Park express clearly their will to be part of the decisions concerning their city and oppose the neo-liberalization of their life spaces via the for-profit destruction of forests, rivers and public lands. They don’t want Istanbul transformed to a giant skyscrapers park.

If the action spread throughout Turkey, this is not only because of the trees of Gezi Park. This is also related to many clashes happening in Turkey since last month between the government and a part of the society. The ban of Taksim Square to the Labor Day demonstrations, bomb attack in Reyhanlı causing 55 deaths and the neglecting attitude of the primary minister after the event, the law on the prohibition of alcohol sale and consumption and the general bumptious attitude of Tayyip Erdogan vis-à-vis his opponents, declaring always the support of 50 % of society for himself provoked also these mobilizations. We should not forget the police violence against peaceful demonstrators (2 people died, more than 500 people injured, at least 10 people lost their eyes because of tear gas canisters).

Now, the government of Erdoğan knows that everything will not be as easy as before. 50 % of support in the society doesn’t mean that you can do everything you want in a democracy; it is not an empty check. For the protesters, this is also time to think about the construction of a real institutional opposition in order to break down the idea of Tayyip Erdoğan who seems to be persuaded that his place is guaranteed as there is no leader able to challenge him in political arena.